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Horse Syndication: A Sure Footed Winner in the
Investment Sweepstakes
Recent changes in the scheme of federal taxation coupled with increas-
ing interest in the equine industry has propelled that industry into the fore-
front of tax sheltered investments. In this article the author takes an in-
depth look at the federal securities and tax law aspects of a typical equine
syndication as a tax sheltered investment.
I. INTRODUCTION
The Tax Reform Act of 19761 was promulgated in an effort to
eliminate certain investment programs. Specifically, Congress
targeted for extinction the so-called "abusive" tax shelter.2 The
Tax Reform Act and those taxation acts which followed 3 created
new and confounding problems for the high income, high tax
bracket individual.4 Such an individual was confronted with this
1. Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, 90 Stat. 1520 [hereinafter cited
as Tax Reform Act].
2. See S. REP. No. 938, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 9, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS, 3439, 3445. An abusive tax shelter is one where the individual
investor's "[1]oss returns ... lack economic reality or viability in varying de-
grees," and is characteristically "[those] transactions . . . [which fail] to produce
a return relative to the risk involved ... ." See E.F. HuTrON & Co., UNDERSTAND-
ING TAX SHELTERS (1979). A basic tenet subscribed to by Congress in enacting the
Tax Reform Act was that "[too many] investments have been motivated by exces-
sive concern with the tax benefits associated with them [and] not [because of the
investment's] economic merits .... S. REP. No. 938, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 9, re-
printed in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 3439, 3445. Although Congress acted
to restrict those tax savings programs deemed valueless, it left untouched those
tax laws already in effect which allowed and promoted economically worthwhile
investments which had incidental tax benefit features. See generally STAFF OF
JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 94TH CONG., 2D SEss., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE
TAx REFORM ACT OF 1976 (Comm. Print 1976).
3. Subsequent to the enactment of the Tax Reform Act, Congress passed a
series of tax acts which clarified, amended, and corrected the Tax Reform Act.
These later acts are the Revenue Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-600, 92 Stat. 2763 [here-
inafter cited as Revenue Act]; The Technical Corrections Act of 1979, Pub. L. No.
96-222, 94 Stat. 194; and the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34,
95 Stat. 172 [hereinafter cited as Economic Recovery Act]. Most notable are the
Revenue Act's modification of the "at-risk" rules and the Economic Recovery Act's
extension of the "at-risk" rules to the investment tax credit. See infra notes 78
and 147 and accompanying text.
4. By enacting tax legislation in piecemeal fashion, Congress relinquished
both equity and economy, two basic principles of tax law, in favor of generating
additional revenue through the disallowance of abusive tax shelters. Presently,
scenario: first, he could invest in a speculative investment pro-
gram masquerading as a tax shelter; or second, he could choose to
contribute his investment capital to an investment well-founded
in law and business.5 If he opted for the first alternative, he was
faced with dubious tax consequences because the Internal Reve-
nue Service (IRS) might disallow part or all of the investment's
purported tax benefits claimed to exist by its promoters, and his
chances of realizing a profit from his investment were usually re-
mote.6 Thus, the question was, "Do I pay my money to the gov-
ernment in the form of taxes or do I invest my money in
something I hardly understand and hope I come out a winner?"
If, however, this same individual decided to take a reasonable ap-
proach in his investment planning, as the second alternative sug-
gests, his investment posture would improve considerably. By
contributing his investment capital to a bona fide investment ve-
hicle, he would most probably enjoy "front end ' 7 tax benefits
the uninformed investor, without competent counseling, is likely to become detri-
mentally entangled in the thread of legal concepts now interwoven in the fabric of
the tax law. See infra notes 46 & 161 and accompanying text. The Tax Equity and
Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, 29 U.S.C. § 1101 (1976 & Supp. III 1982) [hereinaf-
ter cited as Tax Equity Act], includes a provision which imposes a penalty on
those found guilty of promoting abusive tax shelters. A penalty of $1,000 or 10% of
gross income derived or to be derived from the activity may be imposed on pro-
moters of abusive tax avoidance schemes. An abusive tax shelter, under the Tax
Equity Act, is defined as any "plan or arrangement" in which the promoter makes
a statement of tax benefits which he knows or has reason to know is false or fraud-
ulent, or a valuation error in services or property of more than twice the correct
value. I.R.C. §§ 6700, 7408 (West 1982) (added by §§ 320, 321 of the Tax Equity Act).
See also infra note 6 regarding penalties.
5. This choice seems quite obvious; however, not all investment situations
are so easily distinguished. Many times an investor, ignorant of the true tax and
business consequences of a particular investment, is forced to rely on the counsel
of others. Unfortunately, there are too many instances where those giving advice
are interested parties and/or are lax in keeping abreast of the law and its require-
ments. The combination of the unsophisticated investor and an unscrupulous ad-
visor or promoter increases the chances of the innocent investor being
manipulated and injured.
6. Cognizant of the preference accorded partnerships by those seeking to
shelter income, the IRS implemented an auditing plan in 1972 designed to scruti-
nize abusive tax shelters using the limited partnership as an ownership entity. In
enforcing the tax laws, the IRS may disallow certain tax deductions, credits, or ex-
clusions claimed by a partnership and its constituent members. When the IRS
disallows such tax benefits, members of the limited partnership may become indi-
vidually responsible for those taxes deferred or unpaid to the extent they applied
these apparent tax benefits to their own taxes. Moreover, such a disallowance
may entail the imposition of a penalty. See I.R.C. §§ 6653, 6659 (West 1982). See
generally United States Master Tax Guide (CCH) 1 1435 (1981). See also Com-
ment, Auditing Partnership Tax Shelters; IRS Procedures and Taxpayer Liability,
60 NEB. L. REv. 564 (1981).
7. "Front end" in investment situations means short-term or the early years
of the investment program. These include high depreciation, loss allowances, and
tax credits, which are used to defer or eliminate taxes incurred on income from
the investment activity as well as unrelated income.
[Vol. 10: 615, 1983] Horse Syndication
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
which would be truly available and unlikely to be contested by
the IRS. Further, he could participate in "back end ' 8 benefits,
such as profits produced, if any, from the investment program and
the long-term capital gain treatment 9 such profits might receive.
These characteristics are those of the classic tax shelter envi-
sioned and encouraged by Congress.
Once the individual commits to making a reasonable invest-
ment in the hope of sheltering current income from immediate
taxation, while simultaneously creating the possibility of future
profit, what kind of investment should he make? There are nu-
merous investments he could make, and many are quite suitable
to accomplish the ends just discussed,10 but virtually none com-
bine the necessary foundation of law and business with sheer ex-
citement and pride. An investment which accomplishes all of this
is the investment in a horse.
From the dawn of civilization, throughout recorded history and
into the present time, horses have delighted, mystified and awed
human beings. It is not uncommon that people, even today, often
refer to the equine racing industry as the "Sport of Kings.""
Arabians, Thoroughbreds, Standardbreds and Quarter Horses
have each sustained, with varying degree, a meteoric rise in mon-
etary value over the last decade. When compared to recognized
8. "Back end," the reciprocal of front end, means the intermediate to late
years of an investment program, including those years following its termination.
Generally, back end benefits are profits, the availability of long-term capital gains
treatment, and any remaining credits or depreciation allowance. See infra notes 9
and 231 regarding capital gains treatment of gain recognized from an investment.
9. Gain realized from the sale or exchange of property is taxed at 100%.
I.R.C. § 61(a) (3) (West 1982). The noncorporate individual taxpayer is entitled to
treat some transactions as long-term gains. The gain must be the result of a trans-
action involving a capital asset held for the required holding period (normally
more than one year). Then, only 40% of the gain would be taxable. See I.R.C.
§§ 1202, 1221, 1222, and 1231(b) (3) (West 1982). Note: if the property is a horse, the
holding period is two years for long-term capital gain treatment. See also CRAIGO,
Making Tax Dollars Out of Horse Sense, TAX SERVICE IDEAS 17,261, 17,272
(1982).
10. The most common tax shelter programs are those centered around real es-
tate, oil and gas, equipment leasing, and farming. For a fine analysis of tax shel-
ters, see R. HAir & P. Fuss, TAX SHELTERED INVESTMENTS HANDBOOK (1983).
11. This phrase is traceable to the reign of Charles II, King of England. It was
at this time, during the middle to late 1600's, that the ancestors of the modern day
Thoroughbred, which incidentally were Arabian horses, were brought to England.
The kings of Europe made the sport of horse racing into a royal pastime and to
this day the equine industry pays tribute to this influence. The author wishes to
acknowledge the assistance of Mary Fleming, Associate Editor, The Thoroughbred
of California, who was consulted on this material.
indexes of economic prosperity, the rise of horse values has been
nothing short of spectacular.12 Besides the monetary benefits of
investing in horses, there are intangible benefits-watching your
Thoroughbred win a stakes race or your purebred Arabian take a
national championship.
This article will analyze horse syndication as an investment and
as a tax shelter. No attempt is made here to cover all the issues
which could conceivably arise in a typical horse syndication.
Rather, the intent is to analyze the primary factors of a properly
structured horse syndicate. The emphasis is on the tax, securities
and general business considerations inherent to a syndication.
II. THE SYNDICATION OF A COMMODITY
A. Some Background
For many years the enormous cost of purchasing a high quality
race or show horse, together with the high costs and expenses in-
cidental to maintaining and training such a horse, prohibited most
individuals from equity participation in these types of exclusive
horses.' 3 Additionally, those within and without the industry had
a feeling, largely because of the associated capital outlays, that
such an investment was reserved for the very rich. Even those
who had the discretionary financial resources to make such a
commitment often refrained because of the novelty of the invest-
ment and their lack of sophistication concerning the equine in-
dustry.14 In an effort to encourage an influx of new investment
capital, certain groups in the equine industry developed new in-
vestment vehicles and adapted existing ones to accommodate
their purpose.15 To accomplish this end, owners and promoters of
12. The average price of Thoroughbreds has increased 341% from an average
sales price of $8,797 in 1971 to $30,000 in 1980. During this same period, the price of
Arabians has increased 623% in average sales price, moving from $19,822 in 1971 to
$123,628 in 1980. See Barrons National Business and Financial Weekly, Feb. 14,
1983, p. 106. In contrast, the Dow Jones Industrial Average increased approxi-
mately 9.5% from 890.20 at year's end in 1971 to 963.99 at year's end in 1980. See Id.
See also Appendix I at the close of this article which illustrates, in graphic form,
the tremendous value appreciation which has occurred in the equine industry. See
also Gardner, Arabian Horses: A "Living Art Form" with Tax Benefits, NAT'L TAX
SHELTER DIG. 6 (September 1982).
13. Foreseeable expenses are feed, board, veterinary, farrier services (horse-
shoeing), insurance, and training. These fees can quickly deplete an individual's
resources allocated for his horse business. See generally Gardner, Syndications in
Mares, ARABIN HORSE WORLD 193 (September 1981).
14. As is generally the case with investors delving into a new and unfamiliar
area, prudent investors were shy to make an investment without some assurance
and contacts in the horse industry. This resulted from fears of losing large sums
of money.
15. Various entities are available which allow for the amalgamation of finance
and experience; i.e., the general partnership, joint venture, or corporation. The
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horses had to develop a means to diffuse the burdens of horse
ownership and allow for a fair participation in the profits a horse
might generate, in addition to providing expert management and
promotion of the horse for those investors incapable of or disin-
terested in doing so on their own.16 The methods adopted to facil-
itate these goals vary; however, the two methods favored, almost
to the exclusion of all others, are the syndication and the securi-
ties offering. ' 7
When a horse is syndicated, a legal fiction is created. Simply,
the subject horse is theoretically divided into a certain number of
undivided fractional interests, 8 usually, via a "Syndicate Agree-
ment." Such an agreement will state the identity of the horse,
what each interest will cost, and the rights and responsibilities at-
tendant each interest.19 Generally, the number of undivided frac-
tional interests created in a horse will range between thirty-two
and forty, although no definite prohibition against creating more
or less than this number of interests exists. 20
preferred entity in the horse industry, however, is the syndicate. See Husband,
Stallion Syndication, THE WESTERN HORSEMAN 22 (March 1981).
16. Syndication allows for risk spreading and collective ownership. Syndica-
tion does not, where commodity based, provide centralized management which
controls the course of the investment. Conversely, a limited partnership allows for
limited liability, limited risk, and passive investment. For investors seeking the
advice and expertise of others, the limited partnership is ideal.
17. Many times, the word syndication is used interchangeably with reference
to a commodity syndication or a securities offering. For purposes herein and un-
less otherwise stated, syndication refers only to the investment programs wherein
the horse is treated as a commodity, whereas the term securities offering refers to
those investment programs in which the interests offered are considered securi-
ties. Note also that unless otherwise indicated, syndicate or syndication as used
herein shall refer to stallion breeding syndicates.
18. This fiction is in the nature of a tenancy in common. When a tenancy in
common is created in property, each tenant in common retains a vested undivided
interest in the res which is subject to co-ownership. Each co-tenant has a distinct,
proportionate, undivided interest in the property which is freely alienable. Usu-
ally purchasers of syndicate interests are referred to as "co-owners"; such pur-
chasers are referred to interchangeably herein as interest holders, interest
purchasers or co-owners. BLACK'S LAW DIMTONARY 1314, 1315 (5th ed. 1979).
19. The typical syndicate agreement will also have provisions which address
risk of loss or injury, horse infertility (if a breeding syndicate), restraints on inter-
est transfer or disposal of excess nominations, tax considerations, election of a
syndicate manager, and other miscellaneous items. Those clauses which restrict
transfer of interests and disposition of excess nominations are part of any good
syndicate agreement. For the rationale behind these clauses, see infra notes 39
and 243 and accompanying text.
20. The range is the result of two conditions, one physiological, the other legal,
although the legal consideration may be of questionable importance. The physio-
logical element rests in a stallion's ability to "cover" a certain number of mares.
Essentially, when a horse is syndicated it is treated as a com-
modity. As a chattel the horse has certain attributes and poten-
tial which, depending upon the skill and expertise of its owners
(the fractional interest holders), can be exploited to produce
value.2 1 To illustrate, assume individual "A" owns stallion "X". A
decides to syndicate stallion X. Through a syndicate agreement,
A creates thirty undivided fractional interests in X, retains ten in-
terests and sells twenty interests to investors one through twenty.
Assume further that X is now retired to stud and has value as a
breeding stallion. As is the case in most stallion breeding syndi-
cates, the syndicate agreement provides that each interest holder
is entitled to "nominations." A nomination, or breeding right, is
the right to have a mare "serviced" by the stallion to the end that
she conceives. 22 Thus, if each interest holder in the X syndicate
were entitled to two nominations, each interest holder would have
the right to the stud services of X twice per year.
The nature and purpose of a syndicate is joint ownership of a
horse, absent third party management (for other than administra-
tive purposes), pooling of income, and dependency on the efforts
of others for the success of the enterprise.23 Albeit a syndicate
has at its center a particular horse (stallion X in the above exam-
ple) the true attribute and legal character of a syndicate is the in-
dividual interests created in the horse and the separate uses
made of the interests by each separate interest holder. In form
and in substance, each interest holder is a distinct enterprise and
what that holder does with his interest is his exclusive province.
Cover is horseman's vernacular to describe the number of mares a stallion is capa-
ble of servicing during any one breeding season. This will depend, of course, on
whether artificial insemination is allowed by that breed's registry. Thoroughbreds
may be bred by natural service only, according to the rules of the American Jock-
ey Club, Jockey Club Rules and Regulations of the American Stud Books, registra-
tion rules and requirements, Rule 2(c) (Standards of Registration of Foals) (1980).
Arabians may be bred by either natural or artificial service. Legally, there are ar-
guably a number of reasons why this range exists, but the most logical reason is
grounded in the securities laws. Most exemptions from registration pursuant to
the securities laws, where "private offerings" are made, generally restrict to 35 the
number of purchasers. Thus, a nexus between this number (35) and the range of
interests normally offered (32-40) seems to exist.
21. See infra note 22.
22. Basically, where a breeding stallion is syndicated, there are three avenues
for profit. The interest holder can profit from the "get" (meaning a horse's off-
spring) produced by mating the stallion to a mare. Profit can be gained by selling
any nominations to which the interest holder may be entitled. Or, an interest
holder, if fortunate, can realize a gain on the sale of his interest in the syndicate
because the interest appreciated in value. See SEC Release No. 33-5347, 38 Fed.
Reg. 1735 (1973), which discusses securities law and commodities in condominium
developments.
23. Such attributes are prima facie evidence that interests offered in a syndi-
cate are not securities. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
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Whether an interest holder will realize a gain on his investment
rests solely on his entrepreneurial ability.24 Notwithstanding cer-
tain restrictions contained in most syndicate agreements, an in-
terest owner is free to capitalize on his investment at his
discretion. Generally, this encompasses selection of mares to be
bred to the stallion 25 (assuming a stallion breeding syndicate),
the breeding facilities to be used, retention of insurance and ar-
rangements for related breeding expenses.
B. The Application of the Securities Laws to a Syndicate
Pursuant to section 526 of the Securities Act of 1933,27 no secur-
ity may be lawfully offered, sold or transported by means of inter-
state commerce unless either a registration statement has been
filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) in
connection with the security offered or an exemption from regula-
tion is available.28 Section 2(1)29 of the 1933 Act defines three cat-
egories of securities; two specific and one general. The first
specific classification of a security is any interest commonly
known as a security, i.e., bonds, stocks, debentures, etc. The sec-
ond specific classification of a security includes interests or in-
struments specifically mentioned in the 1933 Act: i.e.,
subscriptions for securities, fractional undivided interests in oil,
gas or other mineral rights. However, the most significant portion
of section 2(1) is its general catch-all classification which refers to
investment contracts and certificates of interest or participation
in any profit-sharing agreement. This general provision is deter-
24. This fact weighs heavily on the securities and tax laws pertinent to a syn-
dicate. See infra notes 30-39 and 178 and accompanying text.
25. The great majority of horses which are syndicated are breeding stallions.
Interests offered in breeding stallion syndicates are likely not securities; however,
interests offered in the syndication of a broodmare or where the investment focus
is on showing or racing a horse (necessitating dependence of the investor on the
skills of others for profit) may be found to be securities unless the deal is carefully
structured. See infra notes 42 and 43. Because interests offered in a nonbreeding
stallion syndicate border on being securities, such types of syndications are few.
Aware of this risk, a promoter who desires to avoid this problem entirely might
well formulate his deal in a way which vitiates the very essence of the investment
plan, making the amended plan less palatable to investors. CRAiGO, Making Tax
Dollars Out of Horse Sense, 1982 TAx SERVICE IDEAS 17,011.8 (1982).
26. The Securities Act of 1933, § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 77e (1981) (hereinafter cited as
1933 Act].
27. 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1981).
28. 1933 Act, § 4(2), 15 U.S.C. §§ 77b and 77c (1981).
29. 1933 Act, § 2(1) 15 U.S.C. § 77(b)(1) (1981).
minative of the question whether interests created in a horse syn-
dicate are securities subject to the registration requirements of
the 1933 Act.
Because the phrases investment contract and certificate of par-
ticipation were necessarily inexact, the scope and reach of these
phrases had to be determined through litigation.30 On the one
hand American entrepreneurs are truly adept at creating financ-
ing techniques sui generis, and with the help of lawyers, these
plans are implemented. On the other hand, the SEC has a duty
to enforce the securities laws. It was inevitable, then, that the
courts would be called upon to decide, interpret, and apply the
general provision of section 2(1) to unique financial arrange-
ments. 31 In the landmark decision of SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 32
the United States Supreme Court laid down this rule with respect
to what constitutes an investment contract: "[Tlhe test is
whether the scheme involves an investment of money in a com-
mon enterprise with profits to come solely from the efforts of
others." 33 Like the phrase "investment contract," this test, though
seemingly concrete, was the subject of continued judicial inter-
pretation.34 As a result of such litigation, the Howey test has
been refined to include an investment of money; in a common en-
terprise; with an expectation of financial benefit; to be derived
solely from the efforts of others. The basic horse syndicate, as
discussed above, clearly exhibits two of these elements. When a
syndicate interest is purchased, there is an investment of money
made with an expectation of financial benefit.35 Not so definite,
30. These phrases were broadly phrased to account for those situations which
in substance involved securities, but where no specific rule or regulation was ap-
plicable. See generally H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1933).
31. The following instruments and interests have been held to be securities:
small tracts of land sold to investors for fruit growing where the seller of the land
grew, harvested, and sold the fruit, giving a percentage of net profits thereby de-
rived to the investor (SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293 (1946)); leasehold rights
in small plots of land which entitled each purchaser to a drilled test well as the
property (SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344 (1943)); membership in a
social organization where certificates were issued to members for loans made
(United States v. Monjar, 47 F. Supp. 421 (D.C. Del. 1942)); memberships sold to
raise "risk capital" for club construction (Silver Hills Country Club v. Sobieski, 55
Cal. 2d 811 (1961)).
32. 328 U.S. 293 (1946).
33. Id. at 301.
34. The requirements of a common enterprise (Hirk v. Agri-Research Council,
Inc., 561 F.2d 96 (7th Cir. 1977)); solely from the efforts of owners (SEC v. Glenn
W. Turner Enterprises, Inc., 474 F.2d 476 (9th Cir. 1973)); and investment of money
with an expectation of profit (International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. Daniel,
439 U.S. 551 (1979)), each have been the subject of litigation.
35. The Supreme Court, in United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837
(1975) (purchase of shares of common stock of a cooperative housing corporation
by residents thereof held not to involve "securities"), examined the issue of an ex-
pectation of profits. The Court held "IbIy profits, the Court has meant either capi-
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however, is the applicability of the common enterprise and sole ef-
forts elements of the test.
The courts disagree as to what constitutes a common enter-
prise,36 but in general a common enterprise exists where there
are multiple investors who pool their invested funds for use as a
source for producing profits. Arguably, a syndication involves
multiple investors who pool their funds. But pooling of funds is
absent from a horse syndication. Each investor purchases an in-
terest or interests in the horse; he is not making a contribution of
investment capital to a common fund. The investor's money is
given in consideration for the interest he takes in the syndicated
horse.
Of importance in resolving the issue of whether the element of
solely from the efforts of others applies is SEC v. Glenn W. Turner
Enterprises, Inc., 37 a case decided by the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals in 1973. Turner was predicated on the meaning of the
term "solely." The Ninth Circuit altered the Howey test by inter-
preting "solely" to mean "whether the efforts made by those other
tal appreciation resulting from the development of the initial investment . . . or a
participation in the earnings resulting from the use of investors' funds. ... Id. at
852. The Supreme Court went on to state "[b]y contrast, when a purchaser is mo-
tivated by a desire to use or consume the item purchased-'to occupy the land or
to develop it themselves,' . . .- the securities laws do not apply." Id. at 852-53.
When an individual purchases an interest in a syndicate he is not committing an
idle act. The purchaser does so because he expects to profit from his investment.
Notwithstanding this fact, when the law is applied to a syndicate situation, via For-
man, the investor is deemed to have no expectation of profit because the pur-
chaser is acquiring the interest with the idea of "developing" the interest. This
reasoning is apocryphal when applied to a horse syndication, particularly with re-
spect to Forman, where the interests at issue were provided with the motivation
of finding a place to live. 421 U.S. at 853.
36. The United States Supreme Court has not decided this issue directly. In-
stead it has tacitly supported the position of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals by
refusing to grant a writ of certiorari for a case where this issue was decided by the
Ninth Circuit. SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Enterprises, 474 F.2d 476, 482 n.7 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 414 U.S. 821 (1973). The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in SEC v. Con-
tinental Commodities Corp., 497 F.2d 516 (5th Cir. 1974), held that a common enter-
prise exists where "the fortunes of the investor are interwoven with and
dependent upon the effort and success of those seeking the investment of third
parties." 497 F.2d at 522 (quoting SEC v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., 497 F.2d 473,
478 (5th Cir. 1974)). This position is an adoption of the Ninth Circuit's rule enunci-
ated in Los Angeles Trust Deed & Mortgage Exch. v. SEC, 285 F.2d 162, 172 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 919 (1961). A contrary position is taken by the Seventh
Circuit Court of Appeals, which was first postulated in Milnarid v. MS Commodi-
ties, Inc., 457 F.2d 274 (7th Cir. 1972), upheld in Hirk v. Agri-Research Council,
Inc., 561 F.2d 96 (7th Cir. 1977).
37. 474 F.2d 476 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 821 (1973).
than the investor are the undeniably significant ones, those essen-
tial managerial efforts which affect the failure or success of the
enterprise."3 8 Tentatively, because the basic horse syndication in-
volves an administrator, commonly referred to as a "syndicate
manager," and because this administrator has certain responsibil-
ities and duties, there is slight reason to conclude that this expan-
sive version of Howey's fourth element should apply. 39 Based on
the following, this is untenable. By its very nature, a horse syn-
dication is meant to orchestrate the profitable exploitation of a
commodity (the horse) by multiple parties. Each individual inter-
est holder has the inherent right to do with his interest what he
pleases free from the restraint of others. The success or failure of
the investment is solely dependent upon the abilities of the indi-
vidual investor. Thus, even under this expanded definition of the
Howey test, the fourth element would have no force concerning
the average horse syndicate.
An economical way to avoid the potential risk of violating the
securities laws and to obtain, in effect, a prior ruling by the SEC
on a particular matter is to request a no-action letter from the
SEC.40 When a party asks the SEC to issue a no-action letter, the
request is accompanied by a detailed statement of the investment
program to be used which outlines all of the relevant mechanisms
of the program and, where appropriate, law is cited.41 If the SEC
does issue such a letter, it is proclaiming that with reference to
the information supplied, it will refrain from instituting legal ac-
tion based on a particular aspect of the securities laws; i.e., failure
to register a securities offering. A party successful in procuring a
no-action letter is usually relieved of the expense and burden of
registration or qualification for exemption. This being the case, in
1977, John R. Gainesway of Gainesway Farm, Inc., asked for and
received a notice of no-action from the SEC regarding a stallion
syndicate Gainesway was about to promote.42 Specifically, the
SEC stated that it did not view interests offered in the Gainesway
38. Id. at 482. The policy enforced by the Turner court was the "remedial na-
ture of [the Securities Act of 1933 and] . . .the statutory policy of affording broad
protection to the public. . . ." Id.
39. A viable nonsecurities syndicate expressly limits the powers of a syndicate
manager and most allow for his removal. Moreover, the function of a syndicate
manager should be ministerial at most. Problems are certain to arise when a syn-
dicate manager is given broad powers indicative of a control relationship over the
investors. The more powers granted a syndicate manager, the more likely the in-
terests offered in a syndicate will be securities.
40. Examples of the form a no-action letter should take is found in No-Action
and Interpretive Letters, FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 76,001 (1982).
41. Id.
42. No-action letter issued by the SEC, July 18, 1977, regarding Gainesway
Farm, Inc. (CCH) $ 81-311 (1977).
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stallion syndicate as securities. This event instigated the wide-
spread use of syndication in the equine industry. The thinking
was, although the Gainesway letter was not binding on the SEC
when a different syndication was involved, another syndicate
might be premised on and structured after the Gainesway syndi-
cate; still, such a letter was persuasive and indicative of the posi-
tion the SEC would likely take where other Gainesway-type
syndicates were at issue.43
In summary, the answer to whether an interest in a horse syn-
dication is a security is twofold. First, if the syndicate closely par-
allels the mechanics and operation of the Gainesway syndicate,
then any interest offered in such a syndicate is unlikely to be
43. Id. The syndicate interests found not to be securities in the Gainesway
letter were interests in a breeding stallion. Therefore, the elements which follow
and the decision rendered in the Gainesway letter by the SEC may not always
support a claim that a nonbreeding stallion syndicate or a breeding stallion syndi-
cate which deviates significantly from these elements will be free from a claim
that its interests offered are securities. According to the SEC no-action letter per-
taining to the Gainesway syndicate, a syndicate exhibiting the following character-
istics will not be treated as the source of a securities offering:
(a) undivided fractional interests are sold to investors who desire to
breed mares to the stallion;
(b) each interest holder who obtains "get" (from the activities discussed
on paragraph (a) above) holds title in such "get" free and clear of any in-
terest of the syndicate as a whole;
(c) the syndicate does not pool funds paid by investors, gains are not
shared and risk of loss is on each investor;
(d) unsold interests are retained by the original owner of the stallion;
(e) expenses incurred for stallion care are borne pro rata by each interest
owner in relation to the number of nominations to which he is entitled
during each breeding season;
(f) the entity providing board for the stallion had a right to use a set
number of nominations in each breeding season and a per diem reim-
bursement for boarding the stallion;
(g) nominations in excess of those exercised were to be disposed of be-
tween the interest holders by lot and were not to be offered to the public;
(h) each interest holder had an insurable interest in the stallion;
(i) the owner of a syndicate interest had to give other interest holders the
right to first purchase his interest before such an interest could be sold to
a third party not a member of the syndicate;
(j) nominations to which each interest owner was entitled may be offered
and sold to third party non-syndicate members; and
(k) syndicate interests offered are done so absent any claim of profits to
be realized through the efforts of others.
Id. Placing a restriction on disposition of excess and unused nominations is criti-
cal to a finding that interests offered in a syndicate are not securities. Absent this
restriction, it is foreseeable that the syndicate manager would sell unused nomina-
tions to the public and thereafter distribute the proceeds among the syndicate
membership. This fact alone would probably be sufficient grounds for the SEC to
assert that interests sold in a syndicate allowing such activity are securities.
treated by the SEC as a security. Secondly, and more impor-
tantly, the Howey test is composed of four elements, each of
which must be established before a court may label a certain in-
terest an investment contract, and thus a security. The result is
that if the syndicate is not modeled after Gainesway and tailored
accordingly, every effort should be made to ensure that at least
one element of the Howey test is absent from the character of the
syndicate. If this can be done, one may reasonably conduct the
syndication of a horse with no immediate risk of violating the se-
curities laws now in effect.
C. The Syndicate as a Tax Shelter and Other Tax
Considerations
1. The Limitation on Loss Deductions to Amount "At Risk"
Suppose Mr. Investor purchases an "interest" in "X" syndicate
for $20,000. He finances this purchase by making a $5,000 cash
down payment and by executing a nonrecourse promissory note
in favor of the party selling the interest for the balance of $15,000.
Further, in the same year, Mr. Investor has $10,000 worth of loss
deductions incurred in his syndicate related activities. Mr. Inves-
tor claims the full loss deduction and offsets his ordinary income
derived from other unrelated activities. What is the real eco-
nomic effect of Mr. Investor's investment in X syndicate? Inher-
ently, the nature of the financing permits Mr. Investor the
advantage of a $10,000 tax deduction, which reduces his taxable
income, while having incurred a present out-of-pocket cost of
$5,000. Although it appears Mr. Investor's cost for the interest is
$20,000, in reality he is only "on the line" for $5,000 because the
promissory note is nonrecourse (meaning Mr. Investor is not per-
sonally liable for the obligation underlying the promissory note).
Therefore, until such time as Mr. Investor contributes additional
cash, property, and/or becomes personally liable for any remain-
ing obligation, his actual stake in the investment remains his orig-
inal cash contribution of $5,000. That part of the claimed
deduction which exceeds his out-of-pocket expenditure, contribu-
tion of property or deferred obligation for which he is personally
accountable, is artificial in the sense that there is no real asset or
commitment supporting the deduction.
Prior to 1976, there was no restriction on the amount of artifi-
cial deductions a taxpayer might claim." However, in 1976, as
44. Prior to the enactment of the Tax Reform Act, a taxpayer's losses were
limited, in general, to the taxpayer's cost or other basis in the activity. There was
no accounting for true risk in the investment. See STAFF OF JoINT COMM. ON TAXA-
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part of the Tax Reform Act,45 Congress enacted section 465 of the
Internal Revenue Code (Code), a sweeping measure which cur-
tails the amount of loss deductions a taxpayer is entitled to claim
with respect to a particular investment activity.46 After 1976,
under section 465 of the Code a taxpayer can only take loss de-
ductions where he has a corresponding balance "at-risk." 47 A tax-
payer is considered at-risk to the extent of cash or the adjusted
basis of property contributed to the activity, amounts borrowed
for use in the activity for which the taxpayer has personal liability
which is compensable by reaching his personal assets, and the
net fair market value of his personal assets which secure nonre-
course debt financing used in the actiity.48
Section 465 provides that a loss deduction otherwise allowable
during the tax year which occurred in an activity engaged in the
production of income or in carrying on a trade or business cannot
exceed the aggregate amount the taxpayer is at-risk in such activ-
ity at the close of the tax year.49 In other words, loss deductions
from an investment activity are allowed insofar as the investor
has an equal at-risk figure supporting the deductions.
The premise underlying the at-risk rule is simple: limit loss de-
ductions claimed by the taxpayer as a result of investment to that
amount which the taxpayer has an equal investment position
truly subject to a measurable risk of loss. 50 Though this concept
is easily articulated, mastering the rule which implements the
concept can be an exasperating task. Moreover, transactions fail-
ing to heed the rule, not dutifully patterned in accordance with its
TION 94TH CONG., 2D SESS., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE TAX REFORM ACT OF 1976
(Comm. Print 1976).
45. Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, 90 Stat. 1520.
46. The rule eventually adopted was the "at-risk" rule discussed infra at notes
47-53 and accompanying text. Initially, the House proposed a system termed "limi-
tation on artificial losses" (LAL) to restrict loss deductions claimed in an invest-
ment activity. LAL would have required revenue and expenses originating in the
same activity to be recognized in the same taxable year. This method prevents
deferral of income recognition and acceleration of deductions. See generally H.
REP. No. 94-658, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 9, 25-85 (1976); S. REP. No. 94-938, 94th Cong.,
2nd Sess. 2 (1976). The Senate favored the at-risk rule over the LAL. S. REP. No.
94-938, 94th Cong., 2nd Sess. 2 (1976).
47. See Deductions Limited to Amount at Risk in Case of Certain Activities,
I.R.C. § 465. See infra notes 48-53 and accompanying text.
48. I.R.C. § 465(b) (West 1982). Unless otherwise stated herein, all references
to the "Code" are to the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, as amended.
49. I.R.C. § 465(a) (1) (West 1982).
50. S. REP. No. 94-938, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., at 49 (1976); S. REP. No. 94-1236,
94th Cong., 2d Sess. 412 (1976); See GENERAL EXPLANATION, supra note 44, at 36-37.
precepts, can result in serious and burdensome tax consequences
for the unwary.51
The at-risk rule is not a concern where the deductions attributa-
ble to a particular investment activity are equalled or exceeded
by any income received or accrued from that same activity during
the taxable year.52 The only time the at-risk rule affects the avail-
ability of a proper deduction is where losses from an investment
activity exceed any income or accruals from such activity to
which the taxpayer is entitled or has received.53 Any investment
made in a syndicate should always be evaluated in light of the at-
risk rule. A syndicate may offer a bevy of tax benefits, but may
well be of little use to an investor whose deductions in the activ-
ity are limited by the at-risk rule. Therefore, it is advisable to tai-
lor any financing scheme to comport with the constraints of the
at-risk rule.
One of the signposts of a potential conflict with the at-risk rule
is the use of risk-alleviation devices. Any time the investor is pro-
tected against loss on his investment because of guarantees, stop
loss orders, or repurchase agreements, or is made immune from
personal liability through the use of nonrecourse financing, he is
not at-risk.54 In addition, the at-risk rule is broad enough to apply
to covert methods employed to circumvent the rule. 55 It behooves
the promoter and the investor in the horse industry, therefore, to
create risk in the investment. To the extent risk is present, the
at-risk rule is satisfied.56
In an effort to prevent possible collusion or impropriety be-
tween the investor/taxpayer and a "related" 57 party or an "inter-
51. The at-risk limitation on losses can be the ruination of a syndicate. Unso-
phisticated investors may be shocked to realize that the deductions taken to offset
ordinary income are disallowed. Unfortunately, the investor may have no funds to
satisfy an increase in tax liability caused by the disallowance and potential pen-
alty. The tax burden is increased if the investor made an investment in a shaky
syndicate which is unlikely to return a profit. The result is a poor investment and
unplanned tax burdens-surely not what the investor had in mind when he made
his investment.
52. I.R.C. §465(a) (1) (West 1982), states in part, "any loss . . . for the taxable
year shall be allowed only to the extent ... to which the taxpayer is at risk. . ....
(emphasis added). See also General Rules; allowance for deductions, Treas. Reg.
§ 1.465-2 (proposed June 5, 1979).
53. I.R.C. § 465(a)(1) (West 1982).
54. I.R.C. § 465(b) (4) (West 1982). See also General Rules; amounts protected
against loss, Treas. Reg. § 1.465-6 (proposed June 5, 1979).
55. Treas. Reg. § 1.465-1(b) (proposed June 5, 1979).
56. The most efficient way to create risk where deferred payment is planned is
to make any obligation recourse so that in the event the obligor (promisor) fails to
pay as promised, resort can be made to his personal assets for satisfaction.
57. I.R.C. § 465(b)(3)(B) (West 1982), cites I.R.C. § 267(b) (West 1982), as a
definition of related party. I.R.C. § 267(b) (West 1982), provides in general part
that related parties include "(1) Imlembers of a family [meaning an individual's
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ested"5 8 party, section 465 imposes a further limitation on
amounts considered at-risk. Where the investor borrows money
from an interested or related party, notwithstanding the investor
is wholly liable for any such borrowed sums, the at-risk rule pre-
vents the inclusion of such debts in the amount at-risk.5 9 Gener-
ally, a related party is a member of one's immediate family.60 An
interested party is one who has an interest in the investment ac-
tivity other than simply as a creditor.61 Treasury Regulations
which have been proposed, but not yet adopted, attempt to fur-
ther define what constitutes an interested party. According to the
proposed regulations, a party has an interest in an activity where
that person has a capital or net profits interest in the activity.62 A
capital interest is defined as "an interest in the assets of the activ-
ity which is distributable to the owner of the capital interest upon
liquidation of the activity."63 Further, the tentative regulations
state that "it is not necessary for a person to have any incidents
of ownership in the activity in order to have an interest in the net
profits of the activity." 64  As one commentator put it:
"[ajpparently, the rationale for denying at risk to borrowers who
receive loans from persons having an interest in the activity other
than that of a lender is based on the assumption that the loan
may not be enforced and, therefore, it is really the lender's funds
which are at risk."65
This aspect of the at-risk rule was recently contested. 66 The
brothers, sisters, spouse, ancestors, and lineal descendants I.R.C. § 267(c) (4)] ...
(2) a corporation [wherein] more than 50 percent [of its] outstanding stock
[value] . . .is owned directly or indirectly, by or for. . . [the investor] ... ." Id.
58. I.R.C. § 465(b)(3)(A) (West 1982). See also General Rules; interest other
than that of a creditor, Treas. Reg. § 1.465-8 (proposed June 5, 1979). The concept
of extending the at-risk rule to cover transactions with so-called interested parties
is axiomatic.
59. I.R.C. § 465(b) (3) (West 1982).
60. See supra note 57.
61. See supra note 58.
62. Treas. Reg. § 1.465-8(b) (1) (proposed June 5, 1979).
63. Treas. Reg. § 1.465-8(b) (2) (proposed June 5, 1979).
64. Treas. Reg. § 1.465-8(b) (3) (proposed June 5, 1979).
65. Gould, Problems Encountered In Working With the At-Risk Provisions, 58
TAXES 868, 880 (1980).
66. The context under which this issue was argued involved the syndication of
the Arabian stallion known as Tbin Moniet El Nefous by Bentwood Farms, Inc., of
Waco, Texas. The factual basis of the dispute was as follows. The syndicator
(Bentwood Farms) owned the horse in fee simple. In order to further capitalize
on the horse, its owners decided to create a syndicate with respect to only one-half
of the total ownership interest. Pursuant to the syndicate agreement, the one-half
case involved a syndicator who sold interests in a syndicate using
a deferred payment plan. The deferred payments were to be
made to the syndicator and were full recourse. Investors in the
syndicate then claimed certain depreciation deductions respect-
ing their fractional interests in the syndicate. The IRS sought to
limit the amount of deductions the syndicate members claimed
because the IRS judged the syndicator to be an interested party.
The IRS' position rested upon the implicit assumption that the
entire syndicate was one activity. On the other hand, the inves-
tor/taxpayer argued that the syndicate was more than a single ac-
tivity, i.e., the horse. He posited that each individual interest
holder was conducting a separate and distinct activity. According
to the taxpayer the syndicated horse was a mere instrumentality
of each individual interest holder's horse breeding activity. In
other words the horse was a commonly owned asset used by each
interest holder in his own breeding activity. Ultimately the Serv-
ice accepted this reasoning and allowed the challenged deduc-
tions. 67 The net profits element of the interested party definition
has no application to the above fact situation because the syn-
dicator has no right to any profits an individual interest holder
might produce in the pursuit of capitalizing on his interest in the
syndicate. However, it appears the capital interest segment of the
test is relevant. The horse, the subject of syndication, when sold
or transferred, where the syndicator retains an interest in the
horse will give rise to income for the syndicator. So in this regard
the test of an interested party is fulfilled. The proposed regula-
tions and section 465 fail to define "activity." 68 Rather, section 465
interest in the horse offered in syndication was fractionalized into twenty undi-
vided fractional interests. Each fractional interest had a purchase price of
$100,000, which was usually financed with a $10,000 down payment and a deferred
payment plan for the balance over a five year period. Further, each fractional in-
terest entitled the holder thereof to three nominations to the stallion per year un-
til the stallion died or became impotent. Additionally, the syndicator, and not a
third party, was extending the credit on any unpaid portion of the purchase price
for a syndicate interest. Note that this was the crux of the Service's claim. The
IRS was claiming the syndicator was an interested party because it had an owner-
ship interest in the horse and was extending credit on the purchase price of part
of the horse to others.
67. This case is an unreported case primarily because it never progressed past
the first level of administrative appeal within the IRS. Therefore the IRS never
took an official position regarding this issue in this case. An IRS field agent in
Waco, Texas pulled a tax return of one of the syndicate members, whereupon the
taxpayer was informed that depreciation deductions taken in connection with his
ownership interest in the syndicate were disallowed under the interested party
exclusion of § 465. The field office concurred. The taxpayer filed an appeal in Aus-
tin, Texas. There the appeals officer agreed with the taxpayer and the field officer
was instructed to permit the claimed deductions.
68. I.R.C. § 465(c) (West 1982), discusses "activities to which section applies"
but never defines what exactly connotes an "activity." Further, the proposed regu-
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lists certain activities to which it applies specifically 69 and states
that it applies generally to all activities "engaged in by the tax-
payer in carrying on a trade or business or for the production of
income .... -70 If the specific categorization is inappropriate,
then the determination of whether the syndicator is an interested
party hinges on whether the horse itself is an activity engaged in
by the taxpayer for the production of income. As was earlier dis-
cussed, the activity is not the horse, but rather the investment
program practiced by each individual syndicate member.7 ' The
IRS correctly accepted this reasoning.72 Even though, the syn-
dicator in the case mentioned above was held not to be an inter-
ested party, prudence demands that the draftsman as well as the
investor avoid even the appearance that debt financing was pro-
cured from an interested party if favorable tax treatment, free
from an IRS challenge in the context of the at-risk rule, is desired.
The amount the investor is at-risk in relation to any one invest-
ment activity is calculated at the end of each tax year.73 The sum
at-risk is adjusted upward if any category, which is recognized as
part of the sum at-risk is increased; i.e., the taxpayer contributes
additional cash to the activity or the taxpayer becomes liable on a
loan previously nonrecourse. 74 Conversely, the amount at-risk is
adjusted downward by a reduction of any constituent element of
the amount at-risk; i.e., the investor takes back property previ-
ously contributed to the activity.75 More importantly, the amount
at-risk is reduced by any loss deductions actually claimed against
ordinary income and by any increase in profits distributed or ac-
lations are devoid of a definition for activity. See generally Treas. Reg. § 1.465 (pro-
posed June 5, 1979). However, the treasury regulations which accompany F.R.C.
§ 183 (West 1982) do define what is meant by activity for purposes of that section.
See Treas. Reg. § 1.183-1(d)(1), (1972). By analogy this may be appropriate in de-
termining what activities are within the purview of I.R.C. § 465 (West 1982).
69. I.R.C. § 465(c) (1) (West 1982), delineates those activities to which § 465, as
enacted in 1976, was made specifically applicable. Generally, the specific activities
included motion picture films, farming, equipment leasing, and exploration for oil,
gas, or geothermal deposits.
70. In 1978, pursuant to the Revenue Act of 1978, § 465 was amended to include
a vast array of activities limited only to whether the activity was engaged in for
the production of income or for trade or business. See I.R.C. § 465(c) (1) (3) (West
1982).
71. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
72. The appeals officer was persuaded by the taxpayer that the syndicator had
no interest in the individual breeding activities of each co-owner in the syndicate.
73. I.R.C. § 465(a)(1) (West 1982).
74. I.R.C. § 465(b) (West 1982).
75. Id.
crued for the benefit of the taxpayer, provided the income and
profits derive from the same investment activity for which there is
an amount at-risk.7 6 Any loss deduction allocable to the invest-
ment activity and passed on to the investor can do no more, in
and of itself, than reduce the sum at-risk to zero.77 However,
where the elements which comprise the amount at-risk decrease,
it is possible a negative at-risk amount will result.78 The amount
at-risk will be negative, meaning the at-risk balance is reduced
below zero, where an event or a series of events occur which act
to adjust the at-risk balance below zero. For example, if the tax-
payer has an at-risk amount of $1,000 in an activity and converts a
recourse loan of $1,200 into a nonrecourse loan respecting that
same activity at year's end, with respect to the same activity, the
taxpayer will have a negative amount at-risk of $200.
Section 465 was amended in 1978 under the Code. 79 One of the
changes transacted in section 465 was the addition of a "recap-
ture" provision similar to the recapture of depreciation.80 Recap-
ture, as employed by section 465, prevents a taxpayer from
stockpiling his at-risk amount in one or more years in order to
satisfy the at-risk rule and thereafter reduce the amount at-risk,
having already received the benefit of a tax deduction. The recap-
ture of deductions pursuant to section 465 only applies to deduc-
tions taken after December 31, 1978.81 Mechanically, recapture of
deductions subject to the at-risk rule works as follows: Assume
Mr. A has at-risk $3,000 in a certain activity in 1983. In 1984 Mr. A
properly claimed a loss deduction of $2,000 incurred for his invest-
ment in the activity. Assume further that he has not increased
his amount at-risk but rather converts a $3,000 promissory note
from recourse to nonrecourse in 1985. In so doing, Mr. A gained a
$2,000 tax benefit for which he is not currently at-risk. The effect
of recapture is that Mr. A must now report an additional $2,000 as
ordinary income in 1985 because his amount at-risk fell below the
76. I.R.C. § 465(b)(5) (West 1982).
77. General Rules; amount at-risk below zero, Treas. Reg. § 1.465-3 (proposed
June 5, 1979).
78. Where the at-risk balance becomes negative; the recapture provisions of
§ 465 become operative. The negative at-risk balance can be best understood as a
benefit measuring device. Although an individual may have losses in excess of his
at-risk balance, if he has not reduced his tax burden because of the excess riskless
losses he has received no tax benefit. Conversely, if a taxpayer had previously
claimed loss deductions in conformance with the at-risk rule, but later reduced his
at-risk balance, he has gained an unsupported tax benefit. Any losses claimed ab-
sent risk, where the at-risk rule applies, will be the measure of the negative at-risk
balance.
79. Revenue Act of 1978, Pub. L No. 95-600, 92 Stat. 2763.
80. See infra notes 135-36 and accompanying text.
81. I.R.C. § 465(e)(2)(A) (West 1982).
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amount of tax deductions previously taken. The taxpayer must
report as ordinary income due to recapture only that amount of
deductions which were previously claimed against ordinary in-
come, less any deductions already recaptured and reported as in-
come by the taxpayer.82 Thus, if no tax benefit has been realized
by the taxpayer because of loss deductions attributable to an in-
vestment activity then the recapture provision of section 465 will
be of no consequence.
Any investment activity loss deductions to which a taxpayer is
entitled which cannot be used in the current tax year to offset or-
dinary income are carried forward indefinitely.83 When the at-risk
balance increases, loss deductions carried forward may be
claimed until such time as the deductible amount is exhausted.8 4
The significance of the at-risk rule cannot be overstated. The
failure or success of an investment as a tax shelter is dependent
on the availability of certain tax deductions in its early years.
Where these deductions are limited or nullified altogether be-
cause of the at-risk limitation, it can mean the "death knell" of an
otherwise viable investment. To make the optimum use of any
deductions allocable to the investor from an investment, while re-
maining within the bounds of the at-risk rule, the investor should
at the end of the taxable year have an amount at-risk at least
equal to any loss deduction which will be claimed.
2. The Cost Recovery Allowance
A truck wears out, a barn begins to rot, or a horse grows old-
all are examples of "asset value diminution." Business assets
lose value because of exhaustion, wear and tear, and normal obso-
lescence. Not unmindful of this fact, Congress allows the busi-
ness taxpayer a reasonable85 allowance for loss sustained because
his business assets decrease in worth. This reasonable allowance
is manifested in the form of a depreciation deduction for the
82. I.R.C. § 465(e) (2) (West 1982).
83. I.R.C. § 465(a) (2) (West 1982); Treas. Reg. § 1.465-2(b) (proposed June 5,
1979).
84. I.R.C. § 465(b)(5) (West 1982).
85. Pursuant to § 167, which was the bulwark of the depreciation rules until
§ 168 was enacted under the Economic Recovery Act, "[t] here shall be allowed as
a depreciation deduction a reasonable allowance for the exhaustion, wear and tear
[including] ... property used in [a] trade or business... [or] held for the pro-
duction of income." I.R.C. § 167(a) (emphasis added). See also Treas. Reg.
§ 1.167(a)-l(a) (1965).
taxpayer. 86
The newest depreciation apparatus constructed by Congress is
the "accelerated cost recovery system" (ACRS)87 found in section
168 of the Code.88 Section 168 became law with the passage of the
Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981.89 In theory, any system of
cost recovery (depreciation) should be based on the true eco-
nomic rate of loss suffered by the underlying asset. However,
ACRS is a congressional attempt to spur investment by creating
an incentive for investment.90 The incentive is an accelerated
level of depreciation. Therefore, the rates of depreciation pro-
vided by the ACRS are not indicative of an asset's real useful life
and its true rate of value diminution.91
Section 168 is non-elective, in that when its elements apply to a
particular asset, that asset must be depreciated in accordance
with the ACRS.92 Section 168 applies only to recovery property93
86. Presently there are two Code sections which pertain to depreciation de-
ductions: § 167, which generally applies to all depreciable property placed in serv-
ice before January 1, 1981, and § 168 which applies where depreciable property is
first placed in service after December 31, 1980. These two Code sections co-exist;
however, where property falls under § 168 it must be depreciated in accordance
with § 168. See generally I.R.C. §§ 167-68 (West 1982).
87. The phrase Accelerated Cost Recovery System is the name of the depreci-
ation system enacted in I.R.C. § 168.
88. I.R.C. § 168 (West 1982).
89. Pub. L. No. 97-34, 95 Stat. 172 (1981).
90. A Senate Finance Committee Report details the rationale behind the
ACRS,
[the] present rules for determining depreciation allowances . . . need to
be replaced because they do not provide the investment stimulus that is
essential for economic expansion ....
The real value of depreciation deductions allowed under [Section 1671
has declined for several years due to successively higher rates of inflation.
Reductions in the real value of depreciation deductions diminish the prof-
itability of investment and discourage businesses from replacing old
equipment and structures with more modem assets that reflect recent
technology.
SEN. FIN. COMM. REP. No. 97-144, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 47 (1981).
91. Most depreciable property placed in service prior to 1981 is depreciated
under § 167. Section 167 incorporates a "useful life requirement" for depreciable
property. Property must have a useful life before it may be depreciated. To assist
the taxpayer, the IRS developed a classification system for property called "class
lives." Property was divided into certain class life categories depending on the
character of the property. Early on, class life categories were based on the appro-
priate life expectancy of certain assets within the class. However, the Treasury
began to mitigate the class lives burden by issuing procedural guidelines for the
taxpayer which effectively shortened the tax life of depreciable assets. Section 168
is the culmination of a trend away from a proximate relationship between depreci-
ation and the actual life expectancy of an asset. See Rev. Proc. 62-21 (1962); I.R.C.
§ 167(m), which established the "asset depreciation range" (ADR) as a class life
system in 1971 pursuant to the Revenue Act.
92. I.R.C. § 168(a) (West 1982).
93. Id. See also I.R.C. § 168(e)(1) (West 1982).
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placed in service94 after December 31, 1980 unless property other-
wise within the scope of section 168 is excepted.95 Recovery prop-
erty is defined as tangible personal property used in a trade or
business or held for the production of income which is eligible for
depreciation. 96 Certain kinds of property are ineligible for depre-
ciation. Property not held for the production of income or not
used in a trade or business will not qualify for a depreciation al-
lowance.97 Further, even if property is used in a trade or business
or used for the production of income such property is ineligible
for the depreciation allowance provided in the ACRS if the prop-
erty is held primarily for sale, such as inventory.98 A business as-
set is considered placed in service, "when it is in a condition or
state of readiness and availability."99 Once the taxpayer begins to
develop the asset or capitalize on the asset's value then, at that
time, the asset is considered placed in service. Thus, the taxpayer
may own a horse for some time, but be denied a depreciation de-
duction because the horse is not placed in service. To satisfy this
criterion of the ACRS, the taxpayer must place the horse in a pro-
gram of training and conditioning, be it for racing, showing, or any
other business activity. 00 Although a horse may have been
owned prior to December 31, 1980, if it was not placed in service
until after December 31, 1980, the ACRS still prevails.' 0 l
The ACRS divides horses into two classes of recovery property.
Race horses more than two years old and all other horses more
than 12 years old are treated as "3-year property."102 All other
horses, not considered 3-year property, are termed "5-year prop-
94. I.R.C. § 168(b) (1) (A) (West 1982).
95. Property acquired from a related party, otherwise depreciable under § 168,
is excluded (I.R.C. § 168(e)(4)(A)(i) (West 1982)); see also infra note 120 and ac-
companying text; property depreciated using a method not expressed in terms of a
useful life is excluded, e.g., property depreciated under the unit-of-production
method (I.R.C. § 168(e)(2) (B) (West 1982)). See generally I.R.C. § 168(e) (West
1982).
96. I.R.C. § 168(c) (1) (West 1982).
97. Recovery property, as defined, negates the inclusion of nonbusiness prop-
erty. Id. Further, this follows the usual rule that inventory and personal items are
not depreciable assets. Treas. Reg. §§ 1.167(a) (1) (2) (1956).
98. I.R.C. § 168(c) (1) (West 1982); Treas. Reg. (a)(2) (1956).
99. United States Master Tax Guide, (CCH) 1153 (1982).
100. Whether or not an asset is placed in service is a question of fact and
circumstance.
101. I.R.C. § 168(e)(1) (West 1982).
102. I.R.C. § 168(h) (West 1982).
erty."lO3 The ACRS provides depreciation tables for both three-
year and five-year property. 04 These tables must be used in cal-
culating the depreciation allowance. For three-year property, the
taxpayer is allowed to recover twenty-five percent of his asset's
cost the first year it is placed in service, thirty-eight percent in the
second and thirty-seven percent in the third year. With respect to
five-year property, the capital expenditure for the asset is
recovered fifteen percent in the first year, twenty-two percent in
the second, and twenty-one percent in the third, fourth and fifth
years the asset is in service for the year the asset is first placed in
actual use. 0 5
Regardless of when the property is placed in service during the
year, under the ACRS a full allowance is permitted. 0 6 If a horse-
man placed his race horse in service in November of 1983, he
would be permitted to claim a full twenty-five percent of the
horse's cost as a depreciation deduction for the tax year 1983.
Section 168 is not so lenient where recovery property is removed
from service. The ACRS disallows a depreciation deduction in
the year recovery property is sold or disposed of.10 7 To realize the
full advantage of the ACRS, a horseman, where possible, should
place his property in service late in the year and sell or dispose of
the property early in the year succeeding the last year wherein
cost recovery was available. 08
Section 168 also provides that, at the taxpayer's election, recov-
ery property can be depreciated using the straight line method as
103. I.R.C. § 168(c) (2) (B) (West 1982).
104. I.R.C. § 168(b)(1)(A) (West 1982).
105. I.R.C. § 168(b)(1)(A) (West 1982). The depreciation table for recovery
property is based on a 150% straight line depreciation with a half year convention.
Straight line depreciation may be illustrated as follows: an asset has a value of
$10,000, a useful life of 10 years and no salvage value. If straight line depreciation
is used, the cost of the asset is divided by the asset's number of useful years; viz,
$10,000 divided by 10 equals $1,000 a year. See Treas. Reg. § 1.167(b)(1) (1956).
Thus, under straight line the taxpayer could take a $1,000 per year deduction for
depreciation. By accelerating this to 150% of straight line, the first year's deduc-
tion would equal 1.5 X $1,000 or $1,500, and so on. The ACRS table incorporates
this formula into its predetermined allowance. See SEN. FIN. COMM. REP. No. 97-
144, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 50 (1981). However, because the ACRS, as a matter of
convenience, disposed of prorating depreciation when an asset is first placed in
service, it also incorporates the half year convention rule which acts to partially
offset the first year allowance for depreciation under the ACRS table. See infra
note 114.
106. I.R.C. § 168(b)(3) (B) (i) (West 1982).
107. I.R.C. § 168(d)(2)(B) (West 1982).
108. For example, by placing a horse in service in November of 1983 (assuming
the horse is 5-year property), and depreciating him fully until the horse is dis-
posed of in January of 1988, the taxpayer receives a full 100% cost recovery for 5-
year property while holding the asset for approximately 4 years and 3 months.
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opposed to the tables.l0 9 However, this election must be made in
the first year the property is depreciated under the ACRS or else
it is lost.11o Further, after the election to use straight line depreci-
ation is made, the taxpayer may not switch over to the tables."1 l
Using straight line depreciation, the taxpayer may depreciate
three-year property at three, five or twelve year intervals,112 while
five-year property may be recovered over five, twelve or twenty-
five years.113 In addition, the election to use straight line depreci-
ation entails the integration of the "half year convention" into the
taxpayer's depreciation schedule irrespective of when the prop-
erty was actually placed in service during the taxable year.114
The result is if a straight line election is made for three-year prop-
erty and the taxpayer opts for the five year interval, then, because
of the half year convention, the property will not be fully recov-
ered until six years have elapsed.115
Generally, new businesses do not start up on the first day of the
year, nor do businesses electing to use a fiscal tax year1 6 have
their first day of operations coincide with the first day of their
fiscal year. Similarly, businesses rarely cease operating on the
last day of a calendar or fiscal year. To account for this circum-
stance, section 168 incorporates the "short tax year" rule"17 which
acts to limit depreciation allowable under the ACRS. Thus, if a
business commences activities in October and is operating under
109. I.R.C. § 168(b)(3)(A) (West 1982). See supra note 105 for a definition of
straight line depreciation.
110. I.R.C. § 168(b) (3) (B) (West 1982).
111. Id.
112. I.R.C. § 168(b) (3) (A) (West 1982).
113. Id.
114. I.R.C. § 168(b)(3)(B)(iii) (West 1982). The "half year convention" is an-
other administrative rule of convenience drafted into the ACRS. For § 168 depreci.
ation purposes, the half year convention mandates that one-half of the first year
straight line allowance be deferred and taken in the year following the last year
under which a straight line allowance will be claimed. This rule applies regardless
of the month the property is first placed in service.
115. To illustrate, if 5-year recovery property costing $20,000 is placed in service
in 1984 and a straight line election is made, the depreciation schedule would look
like this:
1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989
2,000 4,000 4,000 4,000 4,000 2,000
116. The calendar year runs from January 1 to December 31. Taxable income
may also be computed based on a fiscal year which may not exceed twelve months
and must end on the last day of its last month however, the last month of a fiscal
year may not be December. See Treas. Reg. § 1.441-1 (1957).
117. I.R.C. § 168(f)(5) (West 1982).
a calendar tax year which ends December 31, then any cost recov-
ery allowed under the ACRS must be reduced to reflect the short
tax year. In the above situation, the business had a short tax year
equal to three months."18 Multiplying the calculated deduction by
3/12 gives the taxpayer that portion of the deduction which can be
claimed. The deduction is allowed in direct proportion to the
number of months the business has existed since its inception.
Analogous to the accommodation given where the half-year con-
vention acts to extend a straight line election, any disallowed de-
preciation because of the short tax year rule may be recovered in
a later tax year.119
Property acquired from a "related"120 party who has previously
placed the property in service is not eligible for accelerated de-
preciation under the ACRS.121 The purpose of the ACRS is to en-
courage new investment, not to provide an accelerated write-off
for property already in use and subject to existing depreciation
rules. 122 Consistent with this policy, section 168 contains a set of
"anti-churning" rules which prevent a taxpayer from rolling prop-
erty in service prior to the ACRS into the ACRS.123 As was noted
previously, section 168 only applies to property placed in service
after December 31, 1980. Interestingly enough, this same principle
used inversely creates an exception to the anti-churning rules.
Although property is acquired from a related party, if the prop-
erty was never placed in service by the related party, and if the
property is thereafter placed in service by the taxpayer, section
168 applies if its other requirements are satisfied. 24 The anti-
churning rules also apply to certain leasing transactions, sale-
118. Id. A full month is accorded even though the business may not have
started on the first of the month. Thus, October 5th to December is three months.
119. The year in which the unused allowance may be taken is to be determined
by regulations which have not yet been adopted. In all probability any allowance
not used because of a short tax year will be allocated and may be taken in the
year succeeding the last year of the predetermined depreciation allowance
schedule.
120. I.R.C. § 168(e) (4) (A) (i) (West 1982), excludes property from cost recovery
under § 168 if the subject property is received from a related party (defined in
I.R.C. § 168(e)(4)(D) (West 1982), as those persons having a relationship with the
taxpayer as defined in I.R.C. § 267(b) (West 1982), (see supra note 57); partner-
ships where the taxpayer owns, directly or indirectly, more than 10% of a capital
interest, etc. (see I.R.C. § 707(b) (1) (West 1982)); or the taxpayer and related per-
son are engaged in trades or businesses under common control (see I.R.C. § 52
(West 1982)).
121. Id.
122. See supra note 90.
123. These anti-churning rules are found in I.R.C. § 168(e) (4) (West 1982).
124. Technically, this is not an exception. The anti-churning rules apply only to
property placed in service, either by the taxpayer or a related party, prior to 1981.
Therefore, property not placed in service prior to 1981 is beyond the reach of the
anti-churning rules.
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leaseback arrangements, some types of property exchanges, and
in general to any transaction which exhibits as one of its principal
purposes the avoidance of the anti-churning rules.125
Investors who purchase interests in syndicates which offer de-
ferred payment encounter tax problems when, pursuant to the at-
risk rule, they are denied tax deductions because the debt they
owe is to an individual or entity who has an interest in the syndi-
cate or is a related party.126 Likewise, because a syndicator (the
entity or individual which syndicates a horse) may retain a cer-
tain equity position greater than ten percent in a syndicated
horse, the IRS might assert that he is a related party and as such
might disallow the ACRS for use in depreciating the syndicated
horse. 27 However, if such a disallowance were contested the IRS
would probably lose. Where a classic syndicate exists there is no
pooling of income or a sharing of profits. 28 Each syndicate mem-
ber conducts his activities free from the restraint of other syndi-
cate members. For this reason, most syndicates elect not to be
treated as a partnership for tax purposes. 29 Therefore, there is
no activity (i.e., no partnership), for the syndicator to be related
at the time the syndicate members acquire their interests.
A property's tax basis is reduced in direct proportion to any
claimed depreciation deduction taken in connection with the
property 3 0 Ordinary income is offset by any deduction al-
lowed.'31 In addition, if the depreciable property is held for the
requisite number of months, any gain realized on the sale or
other disposition of the property receives capital gains treat-
125. I.R.C. § 168(e)(4)(F) (West 1982); I.R.C. § 168(f)(8) (West 1982).
126. See supra notes 57-58 and accompanying text.
127. If the IRS were to prevail in disallowing the use of the ACRS, I.R.C. § 167
would still be available. However, under § 167 deductions are drastically reduced
in comparison to the accelerated recovery permitted under the ACRS. Under § 167
the cost of a breeding horse may be recovered over 10 years or until the horse
reaches 16 years of age, which ever is less. The cost of a race horse may be recov-
ered over two to six years, depending on the horse's bloodline and date of service
placement.
128. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
129. Id.
130. I.R.C. § 1016(a) (2) (West 1982). Note that the at-risk rules have no effect
on the basis of property. Property is assigned a tax basis, usually its cost, when it
is acquired. This tax basis is used to determine gain or loss on the sale or other
disposition of the property. This same basis is generally used when property is
depreciated. See generally I.R.C. § 1011 (West 1982) and Treas. Reg. § 1.1011-1
(1957).
131. I.R.C. § 62 (West 1982); Treas. Reg. § 1.62-1 (1957).
ment.132 Left unchecked, this sequence of events and the result-
ing tax consequences are quite favorable for the taxpayer.
Substantively, the above scenario permits a taxpayer the advan-
tage of using a deduction to decrease current taxable income in
exchange for incurring the illusory detriment of increasing his
later capital gains.133 Disheartening for the taxpayer is section
1245 entitled "Gain from Disposition of Certain Depreciable Prop-
erty."134 Section 1245 has the effect of shutting off the unintended
tax benefit bestowed on the taxpayer as a result of tax law inter-
action. Where appropriate, section 1245 acts to "recapture" depre-
ciation previously deducted by the taxpayer against his ordinary
income. The rationale behind the rule is tax equity. If the law
gives the taxpayer a deduction against ordinary income, then if
the underlying asset is sold at a gain this deduction should be re-
captured as ordinary income. If no gain is realized in the sale or
other disposition of depreciable property, section 1245 has no ap-
plication.135 Furthermore, section 1245, with one limited excep-
tion,136 refers only to personal property.
There are at least two unresolved questions under section 168.
First, will the depreciation allowance for a race horse, treated as
three-year property, be affected if the horse is retired and used
for show or breeding purposes before it is fully depreciated. In
response to this question, section 168 is silent. Under the ACRS
there is no provision to account for the change in use of a horse
(or any depreciable asset for that matter). Moreover, no promul-
gated treasury regulations exist relating to section 168 which ad-
dress this point. Due to this absence of legislative coverage,
reasonable inferences need be drawn. Arguably, as a matter of
administrative convenience such a change in use should be disre-
garded.137 The difficulties incurred with imposing a rescheduling
of depreciation are immense and certainly not deserving of the
132. See infra note 231 and accompanying text.
133. Assume Mr. A owns stallion "X." Mr. A purchased stallion X in 1984 for
$50,000 and placed stallion X in service that same year. Stallion X is treated as 5-
year property and depreciated under the ACRS table. In years 1984 and 1985, Mr.
A claims depreciation deductions of $7,500 and $11,000, respectively, reducing his
basis in the stallion to $31,500. Along comes Mr. B in 1986 who offers Mr. A $70,000
for stallion X. Mr. A accepts. Absent correction, Mr. A will have received $18,500
worth of deductions against ordinary income before he sells stallion X. In addi-
tion, upon the sale of stallion X, Mr. A will have a $38,500 ($70,000-$31,500) long-
term capital gain which is taxed at a lower rate than ordinary income.
134. I.R.C. § 1245 (West 1982).
135. I.R.C. § 1245(a)(1) (West 1982).
136. By implication, § 1245 does not exclude 15-year nonresidential rental prop-
erty which is depreciated at an accelerated rate in excess of straight line. I.R.C.§ 1245(a)(5) (West 1982).
137. This would be in harmony with the policy of simplification underlying
I.R.C. § 168.
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time and effort the taxpayer and the IRS would expend. Not only
would depreciation have to be reapportioned, but what of recap-
ture if a horse previously classified as three-year property is re-
classified as five-year property? Problems would also occur where
a horse was removed from showing and placed in a racing pro-
gram.138 As is readily apparent, the burdens of redetermining the
cost recovery allowance where a horse is placed in a new mode of
service far outweighs any appreciable gain in tax revenues the
government might derive therefrom. 3 9 For these reasons and un-
til there is legislative or agency action to the contrary, the tax-
payer, having properly placed his horse within the three-year or
five-year class of recovery property, should be able to continue
with his original depreciation schedule notwithstanding a change
in the horse's use.
The second question posed presents a construction of language
problem. The equine industry has traditionally determined a
horse's age as one full year at the beginning of each calendar year
regardless of a horse's date of birth. The question naturally arises
whether a horse which is properly considered three-year property
when, though it is actually less than two or twelve years of age,
the horse is, according to common usage and trade practice of the
equine industry, held to be more than two or twelve years old.
Section 168 on its face states that "[t]he term '3-year property' in-
cludes-(A) any race horse which is more than 2 years old at the
time such horse is placed in service; or (B) any other horse which
is more than 12 years old at such time."1 40 A restrictive interpre-
tation of this language would indicate that "more than 2 or 12
years old" refers to true physical age. The better approach, how-
ever, is to look to the context of the rule. Special provision was
made for race horses and older horses. It would seem fairly con-
sistent with the policy behind the ACRS to adopt the equine in-
dustry's practice of artificial aging, especially in light of the
138. In this case 5-year property would be used as 3-year property and the
question would be how much more depreciation should be allocated the taxpayer.
139. If a horse is 3-year property and in the third year of its depreciation under
the ACRS, the percentage of basis left to be recovered should equal 37%. If the
cost of that same horse were being recovered under the 5-year property schedule,
63% of the horse's cost would be left for recovery. Although 26% of the horse's
cost separates the two schedules, were the IRS to readjust the depreciation sched-
ule up or down, more confusion would certainly result and possibly less revenue
would be collected by the IRS. I.R.C. § 168(b)(1) (A) (West 1982).
140. I.R.C. § 168(h)(1) (West 1982).
artificial cost recovery allowances granted in the ACRS. The
ACRS was enacted as an incentive for investment. By adopting
an industry-wide practice to explain an ambiguity in such a rule,
whereby a greater depreciation allowance is achieved, the policy
underlying the ACRS would be furthered. How this issue will be
decided is currently unclear. Therefore, if the taxpayer acts pur-
suant to industry standards and depreciates his horses accord-
ingly, there is no assurance the IRS will not challenge the action.
In light of the purpose of section 168, however, this is an unlikely
possibility.141
3. The Investment Tax Credit and Bonus Depreciation
Congress promotes many of its economic policies through the
taxation system.142 For example, the ACRS is designed to stimu-
late investment by allowing a faster rate of return on investment
capital. To influence investment at an even higher level than
proffered deductions, Congress creates credits to offset tax. A
credit offsets any tax owed dollar for dollar, whereas a deduction
serves only to reduce ordinary income from which the tax is com-
puted. From a taxpayer's standpoint it makes sense, when given
the opportunity, to avail himself of any available tax credit.
Section 38 of the Code authorizes an investment tax credit for
certain property.143 Property classified as "section 38 property" 44
is eligible for the investment tax credit, and generally this means
tangible property.145 Thus, horses would normally be included as
section 38 property, except that horses are specifically excluded
as section 38 property, which denies the taxpayer any investment
tax credit. 4 6 Fortunately for the equine industry, a lion's share of
property associated with the business qualifies as section 38 prop-
141. The American Horse Council reports that it is in the process of establish-
ing a more definite position from the IRS on this particular issue. See AMERICAN
HORSE CoUNciL, TAX REFERENCE SERVICE BuLL. No. 132 (September, 1981).
142. Taxes mean money and where money is concerned people generally pay
attention. Cognizant of this relationship, Congress, through the taxing scheme,
implements many, if not most, of its economic programs.
143. I.R.C. § 38 (West 1982).
144. Section 38 property is defined in I.R.C. § 48 (West 1982).
145. Tangible property to be eligible for the investment credit must have a use-
ful life of three years or more. I.R.C. § 48(a) (West 1982).
146. I.R.C. § 48(a) (6) (West 1982). The Revenue Act of 1977 reinstituted the in-
vestment tax credit. As proposed by the House, the investment tax credit would
have included livestock subject to depreciation recapture. H.R. REP. No. 92-533,
92d Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in 1971 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1835 (1971).
The Senate Finance Committee disagreed with the proposal and acted to exclude
horses from the investment tax credit, stating that "the committee does not be-
lieve it is necessary to provide an incentive to investments of this type." S. REP.
No. 92-437, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in 1971 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1939
(1971).
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erty and permits an investment tax credit.14 7
Congress provided the taxpayer with still another tax benefit
(incentive) when, as part of the Economic Recovery Tax Act, it
completely revised section 179.148 Though section 179 is actually
an expensing section, it grants the taxpayer what has come to be
known as "bonus depreciation."' 49 The expense deduction fur-
nished under section 179 permits the taxpayer to recover a
greater portion of his depreciable asset cost in the first year in
which a depreciation deduction accrues. 150 This expense deduc-
tion is an addition to any depreciation deduction allowed.' 5 '
Where the taxpayer elects to invoke section 179, this will have
an effect on the basis available from which to calculate the invest-
ment tax credit provided in section 38.152 To the extent bonus de-
preciation is taken, the basis in the depreciable property must be
reduced accordingly. After basis is lowered the investment tax
credit is calculated. Thus, it is possible that with a single prop-
erty both bonus depreciation and investment tax credit can be
claimed.
Section 179 combines with section 38 by disallowing bonus de-
preciation for non-section 38 property. 5 3 Stated another way, to
be eligible for bonus depreciation the property must be eligible
for the investment tax credit. Consequently, horses are again dis-
qualified as property deemed suitable for an additional tax allow-
ance. 54 A majority of property and equipment used in an equine
147. See generally I.R.C. § 48(a) (1) (West 1982), which includes most property
as eligible for the investment tax credit. See infra note 156. See also § 46(c) (8)
concerning the "at-risk" rule and its application to the investment tax credit.
148. I.R.C. § 179 (West 1982).
149. I.R.C. § 179 (West 1982), is referred to as "bonus depreciation" because
when the election to use § 179 is made the effect is the same as if additional depre-
ciation were allowed. The asset's basis and ordinary income are both reduced in
equal part.
150. The additional expense deduction provided by § 179 may only be taken in
the taxable year in which the property is placed in service. In tax year 1982, the
maximum deduction allowed was $5,000. This allowance increases to $7,500 in 1984,
and to $10,000 for the years 1986 and thereafter. I.R.C. § 179(b) (1) (West 1982).
151. When the expense deduction granted by § 179 is elected, the amount of the
expense must be subtracted from the basis of the property prior to the calculation
for any allowable depreciation deductions and investment tax credits made there-
after. Thus, if property having a basis of $15,000 was expensed under § 179 in its
first year of service, only $10,000 of its basis would be available as a basis for de-
preciation and the application of the investment tax credit.
152. I.R.C. § 179(d)(9) (West 1982).
153. I.R.C. § 179(d)(1) (West 1982).
154. There is no indication of whether horses, because they were made ineligi-
business could, however, be expensed in accordance with section
179, so long as the property qualifies under section 179.15
Whether the taxpayer is an individual or business entity, if
property is held which qualifies under both section 38 and section
179, an election decision will have to be made. In most cases a
credit is preferable because it directly lowers any tax owed, but
there may be instances where it is better to claim the bonus de-
preciation and forego the investment credit.1 56 The decision will
vary for each taxpayer depending on the surrounding facts and
circumstances. Whichever section the taxpayer chooses to elect,
the investment tax credit and the allowance for bonus deprecia-
tion represent a valid method of reducing taxes. Further, their
overall effect should be gauged and their availability investigated
when analyzing the feasibility of a horse syndicate as a tax
shelter.
ble for the investment tax credit, were inadvertently disqualified from the benefits
of § 179 because of § 179(d) (1) or whether this was a deliberate exclusion.
155. See supra note 148.
156. With the passage of the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982,
I.R.C. § 48 was amended so that as of January 1, 1983, when an investment tax
credit is claimed, the underlying asset will have its basis reduced by 50% of the
amount of the credit claimed. This new law will impact on the decision of whether
to elect § 179 or § 38. An illustration may be helpful: Assume that Syndicate X
owns a mobile quarantine facility which has a tax basis of $100,000 and is placed in
service by the syndicate in 1984. Further, this asset is treated as 5-year property.
If the syndicate claimed bonus depreciation under § 179 or took an investment tax
credit under § 38, the result would be as follows:
§ 179 § 38
Tax Basis of Quarantine Facility $100,000 $100,000
Less Election 5,000 5,000*
Basis For Depreciation Calculation 95,000 95,000
15% of 95,000 14,250 14,250
Adjusted Basis $ 80,750 $ 80,750
* I.R.C. § 46 provides the calculation of the credit for recovery property.
Credit equals the property's cost multiplied by the applicable
percentage (for 5-year §168 property the percentage is 100%) which sum
is then multiplied by the regular percentage (10%). Thus, $100,000 X
10% = $10,000. Basis is reduced by 50% of the credit claimed. $10,000
divided by two equals $5,000.
§ 179 § 38
Expense Deduction Allowed $ 5,000 $ -0-
Depreciation Deduction Allowed 14,250 14,250
Credit Allowed -0- 10,000
(Note, however, that if bonus depreciation is taken under § 179, an
investment tax credit may still be available under § 38. See supra notes
151-52 and accompanying text.)
In this case, regardless of the election taken the reduction in basis would equal
$19,250. However, § 179 affords no direct tax benefit against the calculated tax, dol-
lar for dollar, but will allow additional reduction in ordinary income. On the other
hand, by employing § 38,, ordinary income is reduced by $14,250 and computed tax
is offset dollar for dollar, by a $10,000 credit.
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4. The Hobby Loss Rule.
Where taxation is concerned, perhaps the most important as-
pect of any equine oriented activity is whether or not the activity
is considered a business entered into with an intent to earn a
profit. Regardless of the nature of operation, be it a sole proprie-
torship or a partnership, the issue of business intent exists. This
issue has significance because of the so-called section 183 "Hobby
Loss Rule"1 57 enacted by Congress as part of the Code in 1969.158
This Code section is a legislative response to the "gentlemen
farmer" taxpayer.159 Before this section was in effect, certain tax-
payers would engage in farm activities under the auspices of en-
gaging in a business activity only to receive favorable tax
benefits.160
When it applies, the Hobby Loss Rule limits losses from an ac-
tivity to an amount equal to any income produced by the same ac-
tivity.161 Stated another way, if operative, the Hobby Loss Rule
disallows losses to the extent they exceed profits derived from the
same activity. 62 Losses from the activity may offset activity in-
come, but not other unrelated income. At the risk of oversimplifi-
cation, if an activity is found to be engaged in for profit, all losses
from the particular activity, otherwise allowable, are permitted to
offset ordinary income from whatever source. If, however, the ac-
tivity is judged not to be engaged in for profit, then any losses at-
tributable to such activity may only be claimed to the extent they
reduce income from that same activity. This expression is the es-
sence of the Hobby Loss Rule.
The seeming simplicity of the Hobby Loss Rule, like the at-risk
rule,1 63 belies the nuances and quirks of its operation. Individu-
157. The rule is known as the Hobby Loss Rule because it restricts losses on
activities not engaged in for profit.
158. I.R.C. § 183 (West 1982).
159. In truth, many times this type of situation was entered into not for pur-
poses of gaining a profit, but as a form of leisure which generated losses used to
offset other ordinary income. Section 183, like § 465, is an attempt by Congress to
limit artificial loss deductions.
160. The limitations of § 183 apply if it is determined that the activity was "not
engaged in for profit". I.R.C. § 183(a) (West 1982). See supra notes 44 & 47 and ac-
companying text.
161. I.R.C. § 183(b) (2) (West 1982). Note that the regulations prioritize the de-
ductions in order of interest and taxes, repair and maintenance expenses, and de-
preciation allowances. See Treas. Reg. § 1.183-1(b) (1972).
162. Id.
163. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
als, partnerships, and other entities to which this rule applies
must plan and prepare to meet its impositions. 164 For the inves-
tor in a syndicate, this entails a thorough analysis of the inves-
tor's intent regarding his purpose for the investment, how he will
operate his activities, and what kind of loss and income figures he
can expect. 165 The taxpayer may have catered to other tax re-
strictions, but if his activity is held to be one not engaged in with
an intent to garner a profit, losses allocable to the particular activ-
ity are limited.166 Therefore, an investor, prior to setting up a pro-
gram to facilitate his interest in a syndicate, should examine his
motives and investment posture.
Section 183, together with regulations promulgated thereun-
der,167 establishes a series of factors and circumstances which,
when evaluated cumulatively, help to define an activity's charac-
ter as either profit or nonprofit motivated.168 Before analyzing
these factors it is advisable to highlight the principal tenets of
section 183. An activity, if it is to earn the classification "busi-
ness" as opposed to "hobby," must be entered into with the intent
to produce a profit. 69 This principle is sine qua non to the nonap-
plicability of section 183. Furthermore, whether the taxpayer is
engaged in an activity with an intent to generate profit is inextri-
cably related to all relevant facts and circumstances having a
nexus to the activity. 70 This principle permeates section 183.
These two basic tenets form the cornerstone of the Hobby Loss
Rule and should always be considered when the taxpayer is con-
templating the viability of an investment program.
To possess the requisite profit motive and intent does not nec-
essarily mean the taxpayer must have a reasonable expectation of
164. Section 183 applies only to individuals, partnerships, and Subchapter S
corporations, which are defined in I.R.C. § 1371(b) (West 1982). I.R.C. § 183(a)
(West 1982).
165. Projecting income and loss from the investment is a factor given great
weight in favor of finding a profit motive. The taxpayer should draw up a long
range investment program in order to show how he intends to derive a profit from
the activity. See Golanty v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. 411 (1979). See also Husband,
Horse Business Owners Beware; Tax Court Changes Tune at an Arabian Breeder's
Expense - The Next Dance Could Be Yours, ARABiAN HORSE WoRLD, 360 (Novem-
ber 1979).
166. See supra note 161 and accompanying text.
167. See Treas. Reg. §§ 1.183-1 - 1.183-2 (1972).
168. See Treas. Reg. § 1.183-2(a) (1972).
169. The regulations, as well as § 183, define an activity as entered into for profit
if deductions would be allowable for the taxable year under I.R.C. § 162 (trade or
business expenses) or under I.R.C. § 212 (1), (2) (for the production of income).
I.R.C. § 183(c) (West 1982) and Treas. Reg. § 1.183-2 (1972). The requirement that
the taxpayer manifest an objective intent to produce a profit is unique to § 183 and
is not mentioned in either § 162 or § 212. See Treas. Reg. §§ 1.183-2(a)-l.183-2(b)
(1972).
170. Id.
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actually realizing a profit in the activity.171 Thus, an individual
who speculates in a wildcat oil well searching for oil in an unex-
plored region where chances are remote that he will strike oil is
still considered to be engaged in an activity for profit because on
those rare occasions where oil is discovered, substantial revenues
will be realized. 72 Although the likelihood of realizing a profit is
marginal, nonethless, if the taxpayer conducts himself in a man-
ner indicative of a profit motive, section 183 will pose no barrier to
claimed losses. Moreover, if the taxpayer can prove that a reason-
able probability of realizing a profit from the activity exists (giv-
ing rise to a reasonable expectation of profit), this will bolster any
assertion by the taxpayer that he had a profit motive.173
Facts and circumstances revolving about the activity are deci-
sive to a finding that an activity was engaged in for profit, and
continued for profit. 7 4 As an aid to the taxpayer the regulations
enumerate a set of objective factors which indicate whether an ac-
tivity is engaged in for profit or not. 75 No single factor is control-
ling, nor will a majority of the factors, if found to exist or not to
exist, cause an activity to be treated as a business or hobby by
the IRS.176 Rather, all the facts and circumstances must be
weighed with reference to the objective factors supplied in the
regulations and the overriding principles of section 183. Only af-
ter this has been done may a conclusion be drawn. The following
paragraphs will discuss these objective criteria.
The manner in which the taxpayer conducts the activity is espe-
cially pertinent to any horse activity.177 This relates to the opera-
tion, procedure, and management of the activity. Where "the
taxpayer carries on the activity in a businesslike manner ...
[maintaining] complete and accurate books and records [this]
may indicate that the activity is engaged in for profit."' 78 Further,
by emulating the procedures and management techniques of sim-
171. See Treas. Reg. § 1.183-2(a) (1972).
172. Id. See also Treas. Reg. § 1.183-2(c) (1972).
173. If the taxpayer proves a reasonable expectation, this is within the general
facts and circumstances surrounding the activity and will be judged accordingly.
See infra note 174 and accompanying text.
174. The regulations provide that any determination is to rest on all the facts
and circumstances relevant to the activity. Treas. Reg. § 1.183-2(b) (1972).
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. See Treas. Reg. § 1.183-2(b)(1) (1972).
178. Id. The taxpayer should also keep written records of his cost and income
projections as evidence of his profit motive.
ilar successful equine operations, an appropriate inference would
be that the activity is engaged in for profit. On several occasions
the courts have cited this element.179 A corollary to this element
is whether the taxpayer adopted a new business strategy in lieu
of one proven to be unsuccessful.180 This corollary condition may
at times be the deciding factor in a section 183 dispute with the
IRS. In line with conducting the activity in a businesslike manner
is the idea that pro fora statements, or other projections of in-
come and losses, should be prepared in an effort to further
demonstrate an intent to realize a profit in the activity.181 The
soundness of this proposition can be illustrated as follows: In
some cases, the IRS, in the absence of a taxpayer's projections,
might develop its own income and expense projections for the
taxpayer's activity and, by so doing, prove to the court that no
possibility of the taxpayer realizing a profit from the activity ex-
ists; therefore, the activity could not have been entered into with
an expectation of profit.182
Another factor material to the section 183 equation is the exper-
tise of the taxpayer or his advisors. 83 This is generally shown if
the taxpayer has commissioned a professional or experienced
person to produce a feasibility study for the proposed activity.
Also, by investigating the general business practices and eco-
nomic climate of the activity, a taxpayer can show that he had an
intent to produce a profit in a particular activity.184 For the
equine investor, this necessitates an expenditure of time and re-
sources to learn something about the activity. Even though the
taxpayer researches and investigates the feasibility of the
planned activity, if he ignores what he has learned or the advice
received, the IRS may assert that the taxpayer evinces no real
profit motive.185
179. See Walter E. Edge, T.C.M. 1973-274; Willard and Florence Deerman, T.C.M.
1974-84.
180. This fact was given added weight by the court in Patterson v. United
States, 459 F.2d 487 (Ct. Cl. 1972).
181. Problems in equity may occur where a person who fails to meet the objec-
tive criteria, even though they had a real profit motive and reasonable expectation,
is denied certain deductions when compared to another taxpayer who, because he
maintained adequate and complete records, though harboring an unreasonable ex-
pectation of profits, might be deemed to have possessed the necessary profit in-
tent. See infra text accompanying note 202; see also Treas. Reg. § 1.183-2(a) (1972).
182. This was an actual case. In Dunn v. Commissioner, 70 T.C. 715 (1978), the
taxpayer made no written projections. The IRS compiled a projection and proved
to the court that even in the best environment the taxpayer would have incurred
losses.
183. See Treas. Reg. § 1.183-2(b)(2) (1972).
184. Id.
185. The regulations qualify this by stating a lack of intent is indicated by such
action "unless it appears that the taxpayer is attempting to develop new or supe-
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Also to be weighed is the expenditure of time and effort by the
taxpayer in conducting the activity. 8 6 An intention to derive a
profit from the activity may be inferred where, without personal
or recreational benefit, the taxpayer expends a substantial degree
of time and effort in the activity. The taxpayer will not be penal-
ized, however, if only a limited portion of his time is directed to-
wards the activity.187 Where the taxpayer employs others to
handle the management and everyday requirements of the activ-
ity, this is viewed favorably, even though the taxpayer contributes
little of his own time.18 8
A fourth factor which is particularly relevant to any horse oper-
ation is an expectation of capital appreciation. 8 9 This factor con-
siders whether there is a reasonable expectation that the
activity's assets will appreciate in value so that when liquidated
the activity will sustain a profit because the liquidation amount
exceeds the cost of the assets and all previous losses incurred by
the activity. For taxpayers involved in equine activities this factor
is a blessing. Equine operations seldom produce a profit in the
early years and sometimes fail to produce a profit at all. Current
operations may fail to yield a profit and losses can mount. How-
ever, the activity may own horses or other assets that have signifi-
cantly appreciated in value so that when sold all previous activity
losses are recouped with a resulting net profit. When this occurs,
it helps to substantiate a claim that the activity was engaged in
for profit.190
The success of the taxpayer in conducting similar or dissimilar
activities in the past is supportive of a profit intent.191 Moreover, if
the taxpayer can prove he turned an unprofitable activity into a
profitable one, the burden is on the IRS to prove his lack of profit
motive.192
rior techniques which may result in profits from the activity." Treas. Reg. § 1.183-
2(b) (2) (1972).
186. Treas. Reg. § 1.183-2(b)(3) (1972).
187. Id.
188. Id. See also John F. (Walton) Farris, T.C.M. (CCH) (165) (1972).
189. See Treas. Reg. § 1.183-2(b) (4) (1972).
190. Id.
191. See Treas. Reg. § 1.183-2(b) (5) (1972).
192. This technically does not shift the burden of proof, but where this can be
shown it is persuasive unless rebutted by the IRS. In Fisher v. Commissioner,
T.C.M. (CCH) (212) (1968), the taxpayer purchased a partnership which had a his-
tory of losses in conducting Thoroughbred race horse operations. After the tax-
payer assumed ownership, she was able to reverse the operation's losses and
A factor within the control of the taxpayer is the taxpayer's his-
tory of income or losses with respect to the activity. 193 By plan-
ning and projecting costs and income, the taxpayer can direct his
loss and profit years. Understandably, the regulations state "[a]
series of years in which net income was realized would of course
be strong evidence that the activity is engaged in for profit."' 94
Detrimental for the taxpayer is that a series of loss years in ex-
cess of the number of years that a similar activity would be ex-
pected to suffer losses may be indicative that the activity is not
being engaged in for profit. 195 An explanation for the extended
period of loss years, such as the occurrence of unforeseen and
disruptive events, may mitigate the harmful effect of a long period
of loss years.196 Substantial losses incurred without interruption
or on a continual basis presents a red flag to the IRS and is an
accurate forecaster of whether or not to expect an IRS audit.
However, the courts have held that this element, by itself, is not
enough to prove that the taxpayer is without a profit intent.197
Occasional profits realized by the taxpayer in the activity is an-
other component in the equation. 98 The regulations affirm that
profits earned in the activity are always to be considered; how-
ever, little importance will be attached if profits realized in profit
years are inconsequential when compared to losses realized in
loss years.' 99 On the other hand, a substantial profit in a profit
year, though such a profit is infrequent, will be beneficial to the
taxpayer if, when loss years occurred, the losses were minor.200
Although consistent with the general approach that profit and loss
began to turn a profit. When the IRS challenged deductions taken in her early loss
years the court looked to the taxpayer's business history. The court gave consid-
erable weight to the fact that she was successful in making a profit from an earlier
loss producing activity.
193. See Treas. Reg. § 1.183-2(b) (6) (1972).
194. Id. This is an understatement. The policy behind § 183 is to limit artificial
losses. Where profits are derived, especially if regularly, then § 183 has no rele-
vance, although the IRS might argue to the contrary.
195. Id.
196. Id. Where unforeseen and unexpected losses occur, the taxpayer should
keep accurate records as to the reasons why the losses occurred, i.e., the nature
and date of occurrence of the extraordinary costs.
197. In Patterson v. United States, 459 F.2d 487 (Ct. Cl. 1972), the taxpayer sus-
tained losses in 29 of his 30 years of operation. The court refused to find the activ-
ity as one not engaged in for profit because of this fact alone. See also Engdahl v.
Commissioner, 72 T.C. 659 (1979).
198. See Treas. Reg. § 1.183-2(b) (7) (1972).
199. Id. This factor supports tax planning. A business must be able to show a
normal flow of income and expenses. Except in extreme cases (e.g., the wildcat oil
speculator), the relevant balance between income years and loss years is impor-
tant in showing a profit motive. See infra note 240 and accompanying text.
200. Treas. Reg. § 1.183-2(b)(7) (1972). The equine industry does not guarantee
profits for all participants. There are instances, however, where certain groups or
individuals earn tremendous revenues from their equine operations. This particu-
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in taxable years should be balanced, the regulations allow for an
anomaly in that "an opportunity to earn substantial ultimate
profit in a highly speculative venture is ordinarily sufficient to in-
dicate that the activity is engaged in for profit even though losses
or only occasional small profits are actually generated. 201 The
regulations seem to indicate that if there is a possibility, however
slight, that a sizeable profit will be realized (allowing for sizeable
taxes) then losses, if maintained at reasonable levels, will not
cause an inference that the taxpayer lacks a profit motive. Appar-
ently, because the opportunity for large tax revenues exists in
such a situation, the IRS is willing to compromise. This seem-
ingly is out of tune with the spirit of the regulations which re-
quires a modicum of reasonableness where profit expectations
are concerned, although this is never expressly stated.202
The regulations also list the financial status of the taxpayer as a
criterion.203 The regulations allow the taxpayer a positive infer-
ence that he is, indeed, engaged in an activity for profit where he
has no (or very little) income from activities or sources other
than the activity in question. This premise relies on the supposi-
tion that if the taxpayer depends on the activity for his livelihood,
it is likely that he conducts it in a manner conducive to profits.
Conversely, the regulations place a negative brand on a situation
where the taxpayer receives a substantial percentage of his in-
come from sources apart from the activity if the activity is a
loss. 204
A somewhat elusive element, the last of the objective factors
described in the regulations, is the degree of personal pleasure or
recreation present in the activity.205 Personal motives, not busi-
ness motives, combined with an activity which exhibits a minimal
chance of producing profit will serve to indicate an absence of a
profit motive.206 If little or no personal pleasure can be derived
from the activity, it is more likely an intent to produce a profit will
lar element, in light of the above, appears to mesh with the realities of the equine
industry.
201. Id.
202. The regulations make allowance for the "big hit"; otherwise they stress
reasonableness of losses. See generally Treas. Reg. § 1.183-2(b) (1972).
203. See Treas. Reg. § 1.183-2(b) (8) (1972).
204. Id.
205. See Treas. Reg. § 1.183-2(b) (9) (1972).
206. Id.
be inferred.2 7 The regulations do not require the taxpayer to re-
serve only profit intentions for an activity. The taxpayer may
(and probably will) have other reasons for the investment and
still be deemed to have engaged in the activity with an intent to
produce profit. Almost without exception, this is the case in
equine investments. The taxpayer is entitled to enjoy his horse
activities so long as there is an accompanying profit motive.
The regulations attempt to give the taxpayer an objective mea-
suring rod. Even if the taxpayer diligently follows the regula-
tions, however, there is no absolute assurance that his activity
and any losses originating therefrom will be unchallenged by the
IRS. Congress remedied this by allowing for two statutory pre-
sumptions in section 183.208 Both presumptions fall under the
"two out of seven rule."209 This general rule provides that if a tax-
payer is engaged in an activity for which over 50% of the opera-
tion is comprised of equine activities 210 then if in any seven year
period the activity realizes and reports a profit in at least two of
those seven years, the activity will be presumed to be engaged in
for profit.21
The first presumption provided in section 183 is a "General Rule
Presumption."212 The General Rule Presumption does not de-
pend on the taxpayer to the extent that he must elect to invoke
this rule.213 This General Rule Presumption arises by force of one
thing-profit years. Thus, if the taxpayer is audited by the IRS
and certain losses are disallowed because the underlying activity
is held not to be engaged in for profit, the taxpayer may resort to
the General Rule Presumption, although no earlier action on his
part was made.214 If the taxpayer can prove that two profit years
have occurred in the requisite period, then all or a portion of the
disallowed losses may be claimed unless the IRS establishes that
the activity was not engaged in for a profit.215 The General Rule
Presumption, however, has a limitation. The presumption will
operate only for losses in excess of income to be used against
207. Id.
208. I.R.C. § 183(d), (e) (West 1982).
209. Id.
210. "[A]n activity consists in major part of the breeding, training, showing, or
racing of horses for the taxable year if the average of the portion of expenditures
attributable ... [to such activities] was at least 50 percent of the total expendi-
tures attributable to the activity for such prior taxable years." Treas. Reg. § 1.183-
l(c) (3) (1972).
211. I.R.C. § 183(d) (West 1982).
212. Id.
213. Where two profit years exist in any seven years the General Rule Pre-
sumption is automatic.
214. Id.
215. See infra note 217.
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other ordinary income only for the years following the second
profit year up to seven years from the first profit year.216 There-
fore, if in year one a profit is realized, but not until year five is an-
other profit realized, then only years six and seven would be
encompassed by the General Rule Presumption. 217
The General Rule Presumption is just that-a presumption. It
is a rebuttable presumption which, when activated, shifts the bur-
den of proof.21 8 Where the General Rule Presumption is in effect,
the IRS has the burden of proving no profit motive in the years
affected. The taxpayer enjoys the presumption that he was en-
gaged in the activity for profit. This shift in the burden of proof is
often the key ingredient to a taxpayer prevailing in a section 183
case over the IRS.219
The second presumption provided by section 183 is only avail-
able for new businesses. 220 This "Special Rule Presumption" is
elective and thus is of no consequence unless the taxpayer
chooses to invoke it.221 Invoking the "Special Rule Presumption,"
however, has both benefits and risks. If the election is seasonably
made 222 and the activity has two profit years at any time during
the next seven years, then for each of the seven years, any losses
sustained are afforded the presumption that they are proper and
may be used against ordinary income.223 So unlike the General
Rule Presumption, so long as two profit years occur, all losses
216. I.R.C. § 183(d) (West 1982); see also Treas. Reg. § 1.183-1(c) (1972).
217. If the taxpayer had an income statement which looked like this:
Year. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Profit: $100 100
Loss: $(20) (40) (50) (70) (80)
the taxpayer would have the burden of proving that he was engaged in the activity
with an intention to derive a profit in loss years two through four; however, be-
cause of the General Rule Presumption, the IRS would have the burden of proving
the taxpayer lacked an intent to produce a profit from the activity in years six and
seven. It should be remembered that the presumption arises only if the equine
activity engaged in is substantially the same throughout all of the relevant taxable
period. See generally, Treas. Reg. § 1.183-1(c)(3) (1972).
218. I.R.C. § 183(d) (West 1982).
219. It is possible also that in the face of the General Rule Presumption the IRS
may refrain from challenging any losses claimed.
220. I.R.C. § 183(e)(2) (West 1982).
221. LR.C. § 183(e)(1) (West 1982).
222. The taxpayer generally has three years from the date that his first tax re-
turn is due (without regard to extensions), but no later than 60 days after the tax-
payer receives a written notice that the IRS is about to disallow certain loss
deductions attributable to a certain activity engaged in by the taxpayer. Temp.
Treas. Reg. § 12.9(c) (2) (adopted March 14, 1974 by T.D. 7308).
223. I.R.C. § 183(e) (West 1982).
from any year within the first seven years are allowable, not just
from those years following the second profit year.224 The effect of
the Special Rule Presumption is to prevent an audit by the IRS
until after the sixth year of operations. 225 What if the activity
fails to generate two profit years in the first seven years of opera-
tion? This is the risk in invoking the election. In electing to use
the Special Rule Presumption the taxpayer stops the IRS from
conducting an audit in the first years of the activity.22 6 Combine
this with a failure to meet the terms of the presumption, and an
invitation for an audit is given to the IRS. This election puts the
IRS on notice.2 27 A cautious taxpayer should, therefore, proceed
carefully when an election to use the Special Rule Presumption is
considered.
The roles of the General Rule Presumption, the Special Rule
Presumption, and the taxpayer can best be explained by an anal-
ogy. Suppose we are at a circus and viewing a high wire act. The
high wire is the Special Rule Presumption and the tightrope
walker is the taxpayer. If he manages to remain on the high wire
(meets the elements of the Special Rule), he makes a safe cross-
ing; however, should he slip and fall from the wire, the net below
will save him. The lifesaving net is the General Rule Presump-
tion. Thus, even if the Special Rule is unavailable, the taxpayer
can also attempt to minimize his tax burden if he can show the
availability of the General Rule Presumption.228
The General Rule Presumption and the Special Rule Presump-
tion each have a common requirement that at least two profit
years must occur during a seven year period. Profit years and the
ability to plan for them are essential to the taxpayer who wishes,
pursuant to section 183, to avoid an audit by the IRS. Generally, a
profit year exists if "the gross income derived from an activity...
exceeds the deductions attributable to the activity. ... 229 It is
incumbent upon the taxpayer to plan for profit years by structur-
ing his activity to make the optimum use of the tax laws.
224. Thus, with reference to the example supra at note 217, the losses sustained
in years two through four would also be allowed a presumption of deductability in
addition to those losses incurred in years six and seven.
225. I.R.C. § 183(e) (1) (West 1982). However, by making the election the tax-
payer agrees to allow the IRS to assess any deficiency from the early years of the
operation up through the later years until two full years after the seventh year
has expired. See I.R.C. § 183(e) (4) (West 1982).
226. I.R.C. § 183(e) (West 1982).
227. See AMERICAN HORSE CouNcIL, TAx REFERENCE SERVICE BULL. No. 139
(May 1982).
228. Although not all taxable years under IRS scrutiny may be covered by the
General Rule Presumption, some would possibly be. As a result, some loss deduc-
tions may be salvaged.
229. Treas. Reg. § 1.183(1) (c) (1972).
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Section 183 allows the taxpayer the advantage of including the
full amount of any gain realized in gross income even though any
such gain is taxed at the preferable long-term capital gains
rate.230 Thus, if an asset were sold at a profit of $100, then even if
only $40 of this was taxed because of capital gains treatment,23 1
the full $100 is included in gross income for section 183 purposes.
Furthermore, section 183 does not account for net operating loss
carryovers. 232 Losses are only calculated based on the year in
question and do not include carryover losses. A profit year is de-
termined based on events which occurred in that same year.233
In addition to the tax treatment of long-term capital gains and
net operating losses carried forward by section 183, there are
other avenues open to the taxpayer to create a profit year. To in-
crease income and lessen expenses, the taxpayer can tailor his
depreciation schedules, 23 4 sale of assets, 235 payment of ex-
penses, 236 and he can manage other expenses in his operation so
that a profit year is achieved.23 7 The best approach is to maintain
230. Id.
231. Section 1231(b) (3) (West 1982), qualifies horses for capital gains treatment
if they are held for at least two years. This means that any gain realized which is
treated as a long-term capital gain will be discounted 60% before taxed. Thus, of
$100 in long-term capital gain, only $40 is taxed. I.R.C. § 1231 (West 1982); I.R.C.
§ 1202 (West 1982).
232. Treas. Reg. § 1.183-1(c)(1) (1972).
233. See generally Treas. Reg. § 1.183-1(c) (1972).
234. If the taxpayer is engaged in a new activity wherein depreciable assets are
being depreciated under the ACRS it might be profitable to elect straight line de-
preciation because it allows a smaller depreciation expense which permits a larger
income. Furthermore, if the taxpayer will elect to take additional expensing under
§ 179 this should be done in a year where no profit is derived.
235. There is an obvious priority when selling assets: first, after they are eligi-
ble for long-term capital gains treatment; and second, in a year where a profit can
be shown. Of course, if business dictates otherwise, i.e., a horse is losing value
rapidly, a sound business decision should prevail.
236. By prepaying expenses, the taxpayer can cause a loss year or create a
profit year. However, there are restrictions on the prepayment of expenses. Basi-
cally, the prepayment must not materially distort income and should be a pay-
ment as opposed to a refundable deposit. See Van Raden v. Commissioner, 71 T.C.
1083 (1979), aftd, 650 F.2d 1046 (9th Cir. 1981) (allowing deduction) and Rev. Rul.
75-152, 1975-1 C.B. 144. Further, the material-distortion test requires that prepay-
ment have a business purpose other than the avoidance of taxes. For further de-
tail, see Comment, Prepaid Feed Expense: Another Look At The Deposit, Business
Purpose, And Distortion Of Income Tests, 31 DRAKE L. REV. 653 (1981-82).
237. This would entail the use of installment sales, etc. See Planning the Profit
Year, 2 THE PROFESSIONAL HORSEMAN (August 1981).
a balance of loss and profit amounts. 238 It is better to have a re-
spectable profit year as opposed to a huge profit year, and the op-
posite is true where losses are concerned. The emphasis should
be on evidencing a profit intent via the facts and circumstances
surrounding the activity. If the taxpayer modifies his activity to
such an extent that his profit and losses appear wholly artificial,
the purpose of the planning is vitiated.239
5. Election Not to be Treated as a Partnership
In most syndicates, the syndicate agreement will contain a pro-
vision where it states that if the syndicate is found to be a part-
nership for taxation, the syndicate members elect not to be
treated as a partnership.240 This provision exists because it is
generally more favorable for the syndicate to be treated as a co-
ownership vehicle rather than as a partnership. 241 If the syndi-
cate were treated as a partnership and no election made to disa-
vow this, the syndicate would have to ifie a partnership
information return242 with the IRS, and any losses would have to
be allocated to the syndicate members as if they were partners.
Further, the taxation of partnerships is a complex area which can
confuse the most astute advisor. If no plan were made to address
partnership tax issues, the syndicate and its members would be-
come immersed in the mire of separating out expenses and in-
come at the partnership level, instead of at the individual level as
envisioned by the syndicate membership.243
Various types of syndicates exist. There is the typical stallion
breeding syndicate, which has been the subject of this article,
mare syndicates, and racing syndicates. For federal taxation pur-
238. See DAVIS, HORSE OWNERS AND BREEDERS TAX MANuAL, (1982) for an ex-
cellent discussion of the Hobby Loss Rule and how to plan for a profit year.
239. The clumsy taxpayer who mismatches his expenses and income may be in
for a rude awakening if the IRS decides his motive was not to make a profit, but
rather was to claim artificial losses. If the IRS is successful in showing an artificial
series of loss and profit years, a court might disallow losses to the extent they ex-
ceed income from the activity.
240. This is done as a matter of convenience as much as a matter of tax plan-
ning. By including it in the syndicate agreement, the administrative problem of
securing the membership's consent at a later time is avoided. Further, the Code
allows certain taxpayers to elect out of the provisions of subchapter k which gov-
erns the taxation of partnership. See Treas. Reg. § 1.761-2 (1972).
241. A partnership reports its income at two levels: the partnership level and
individual partner level. If the syndicate is treated as a co-ownership entity only,
the syndicate is not required to file a tax return.
242. I.R.S. Form 1065.
243. A nonsecurities syndicate involves no pooling of income or expenses for
allocation. Each syndicate member channels his expenses and income in his own
way; whereas if the members were partners, income and expenses would be deter-
mined at the partnership level.
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poses, a partnership includes those relationships consisting of
two or more persons who have joined together to carry on a
financial operation or venture, not including a trust, estate or cor-
poration.244 Thus, a stallion breeding syndicate, where excess
nominations are offered to syndicate members first, would most
likely be considered as a co-ownership of property.245 But, where
the activity of the syndicate is such that income and losses are
pooled and shared, it is probable that the IRS will treat the activ-
ity as a partnership. 246 This may develop where a racing or breed-
ing syndicate is involved.247 The nature and operation of the
syndicate controls whether it should be treated as a partnership.
Thus, to avoid classification as a partnership, and to avoid a viola-
tion of the securities laws,24 8 the syndicate agreement should pre-
vent the pooling of income for distribution to syndicate members.
The regulations permit the syndicate to make an election not to
be treated as a partnership if it is found to be one.249 The regula-
tions provide that "[tihe commissioner [of the IRS] may exclude
from partnership status, at the election of the members, certain
unincorporated organizations used for investment only or for the
joint production, extraction, or use-but not the sale--of property
under an operating agreement .... -250 Thus, because there is a
proviso requiring that no services or products be sold from the
jointly held property, if a mare syndicate sold off foals and the
proceeds were divided among the syndicate membership, the
election would be unavailable. 25 '
For the advisor and the' investor, whether a syndicate will be
treated as a partnership and, if it is, whether the syndicate can
244. I.R.C. § 761 (West 1982).
245. The syndicate must take steps to avoid a sale of an asset with a concomi-
tant distribution of income. This may cause the syndicate to be viewed as a part-
nership as well as supporting a claim that the interests sold in the syndicate are
securities.
246. Treas. Reg. § 1.761-1(a) (1956).
247. A racing or breeding syndicate in the absence of constraints could be
viewed as a partnership for tax purposes. If a horse is raced and a sizable purse is
won it must be distributed to the syndicate membership. Arguably, this is a part-
nership because there is a group of individuals engaged in a common enterprise
and a profit amount is shared.
248. A security may be found to exist where money is pooled to engage in a
business with profits to come from others. See supra note 35 and accompanying
text.
249. See Treas. Reg. § 1.761-2 (1972).
250. See United States Master Tax Guide, (CCH) 304 (1981).
251. See I.R.C. § 761(a) (West 1982).
properly elect not to be treated as a partnership is significant. If
the syndicate is treated as a partnership for tax purposes, then
the individual investor has little control over what expenses of
the syndicated horse he may claim because as an asset of the
partnership, the horse's depreciating schedule as well as other ex-
penses must be figured at the partnership level and then allo-
cated.252 In addition, there is considerable expense in connection
with filing a partnership return. These are but two of the
problems to be encountered. The investor should proceed cau-
tiously in this respect and should ascertain the nature of the syn-
dicate before investing.
III. CONCLUSION
In the final analysis, does an investment in a horse syndication
make sense? As a tax shelter, an equine investment is an excel-
lent means to accomplish, in the same activity, both short-term
losses and long-term capital gains. 25 3 The real test, however, is
whether any one particular syndicate is a good business invest-
ment. By making a good business decision, the potential of gain-
ing a profit is exponentially increased. A good tax shelter is not
one which merely allows for massive loss deductions, since this
alone would be disfavorable, 25 4 but a good tax shelter also allows
for the potential of gaining profits at a later time. Considered in
this context, an equine investment is proper so long as the under-
lying program is workable and truly capable of producing a profit.
Apart from the business aspects of a syndicate, the investor or
his advisor must always be cognizant of the securities and tax
laws.25 5 A good business investment is of little use if the tax
benefits flowing from it are denied or deferred.25 6 It makes good
252. See supra note 241; see also I.R.C. §§ 701-761 (West 1982).
253. Short-term losses can be accomplished by depreciation, general business
and related expenses, plus investment tax credits where available. Furthermore,
an interest in a horse or other property held for the production of income or used
in a trade or business may qualify for preferential capital gains treatment. There-
fore, where a tax shelter works, it allows the investor short-term tax savings or
deferral which is presently valuable since it frees current income for other uses.
At the same time, the investor may participate in later profits which are taxed at a
lower rate because they are considered long-term capital gains.
254. This will necessarily depend on the horse or horses involved, the manage-
ment, boarding, facilities, and promotional activities.
255. The investor need only concern himself with the potential penalties he
might experience if he were to wade in muddy tax waters. The advisor, on the
other hand, especially if a member of the bar, must concern himself with the re-
cent tax enactments, see supra note 4, as well as with ethical considerations. See
P. Sax, Lawyer Responsibility In Tax Shelter Opinions, 34 TAx LAWYER 5 (Fall,
1980); and D. Block, An Overview: Responsibilities of Attorneys Under the Federal
Securities Laws, 36 BusinEss LAWYER 1781 (July, 1981).
256. Because a dollar invested today is worth more than a dollar to be received
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business sense as well as legal sense to review and consider the
potential legal implications.
Once the business and legal aspects of the syndicate are consid-
ered, then the investor's decision becomes easier. When the busi-
ness and legal elements turn up positive, then the investor need
only decide whether he likes the horse or horses offered in syndi-
cation.257 If the horse appeals to the investor and if the investor
opts to purchase a syndicate interest, he will then become a co-
owner of a beautiful living art object which has the incidental
benefits of allowing tax benefits and profits. In this world of inan-
imate and intangible investments, it is comforting to know that a
horse is an investment you can get on and write-off into the
sunset.
THOMAS R. CATANESE*
in the future, the value of a tax shelter is emasculated if the purported tax benefits
are hindered and substantially delayed.
257. This aspect of an equine investment sets it apart from most other tax shel-
tered investments. One additional benefit of investing in horses is that they have
the ability to reproduce.
* The author gratefully acknowledges the assistance of Mr. B. Paul Hus-
band, member of the California Bar. However, it is emphasized that to the extent
there are errors or omissions, the article and the views expressed herein are to be
attributed solely to the author.
APPENDIX I
Average Thoroughbred and Arabian Prices Compared to Dow-Jones
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- I- Thoroughbred prices by the American Horse Council, Washington, D.C.
2- Lasma sale prices by the Arabian Council and Bask Classic
-3- The Dow Jones Industrial Average figure for 1980 is the closing average on Nov. 1, 1980.
